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THE SUPREME COURT AND OUR CULTURE OF
IRRESPONSIBILITY
Mary J Davis*
In this article, Professor Davis chronicles the Supreme Court's expan-
sion of the "culture of irresponsibility," where institutional defendants
are freed from tort liability with no check on the abuse of such immu-
nity. Professor Davis describes the Court's progression toward immu-
nity in products liability decisions of the past decade including East
River Steamship, Boyle, Cipollone, and Lohr. Noting the effect of the
Court's decisions in promoting institutional irresponsibility, Professor
Davis encourages the Court to use its "cultural influence" and recon-
sider its broad extension of immunity which has spread to situations
and institutional defendants the Court never imagined.
"Our privileges can be no greater than our obligations. The pro-
tection of our rights can be no larger than the performance of our
responsibilities."'
John F Kennedy
INTRODUCTION
We are a society of avoiders of responsibility. One does not have to
look far to see evidence supporting this conclusion in everyday life; it
is inevitable if one pays any attention at all to current events. And it
is perhaps most clearly seen in the evolution of legal principles defin-
ing responsible conduct. Tort reformers are constantly bemoaning the
litigation explosion, fueled, so they claim, by plaintiffs who want some-
thing for nothing and who have only themselves to blame for their
harm.2 Many legal observers opine that tort law has increasingly cre-
ated rules imposing liability-i.e., providing rights to victims-without
adequately emphasizing the responsibilities which accompany those
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. BA, Univer-
sity of Virginia; J.D., Wake Forest University School of Law. My gratitude goes to Kathe-
rine Sodini and Elizabeth Howard, two exceptional research assistants, for their valua-
ble assistance. Thanks to my colleague, Richard Ausness, whose counsel I always seek
and whose observations always make my work richer.
1. President's Remarks in Nashville at the 90th Anniversary Convocation of Van-
derbilt Univ., PUB. PAPERS 406, 407 (May 18, 1963) [hereinafter Kennedy Speech].
2. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES (1988) (discussing the recent litigation explosion and the need for reformation).
For recent popular literature on this point, see JOE KOHUT, So SuE ME (1993).
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rights.3 Consistent with this observation, old common law rules provid-
ing immunity from liability had been, until recently, on the decline.4
The debate over tort rights and responsibilities seems to center
primarily around how to deal with those who abuse the rights afforded
them and less often on the idea that certain rights should not be rec-
ognized at all. In response to the increasing concern that rights have
been recognized without the incumbent responsibility, many have ob-
served that the "owners" of rights should bear some concomitant recog-
nition that they have, at the least, a responsibility not to abuse the
right.5 Similarly, when a responsibility that would otherwise be recog-
nized under existing law is immunized from liability, such freedom
from responsibility is also a right in itself and should be accompanied
by an obligation not to abuse it. This article explores the increasing
avoidance of responsibility by those who have been bestowed with the
"right" to be free from liability through immunities, and one institution
that has encouraged abuse of that right, the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In particular, this article chronicles the way in which the Supreme
Court of the United States has encouraged the culture of irresponsibil-
ity by creating new common law immunities, creatively extending old
ones, and interpreting Congress's intent to federalize these immuni-
ties. Through four significant products liability decisions in the last
decade, the Court has contributed to the culture that "privileges [are]
greater than our obligations."6 Part II of the article briefly summarizes
the Court's approach to responsibility through the following cases in
which it has interpreted products liability immunity rules over the last
3. E.g., HUBER, supra note 2; Mary Ann Glendon, Does the United States Need
"Good Samaritan" Laws?, RESPONSIVE COMhiNuIY, Winter 1990-91, at 9 (discussing the
lack of civic responsibility associated with the no-duty-to-rescue rule).
4. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCmvARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTs (9th ed. 1995).
An immunity. . . avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the
limits of the immunity itself. It is conferred, not because of the particular
facts, but because of the status or position or relation of the favored defend-
ant. It does not deny the tort, but the resulting liability. The immunity does
not mean that conduct that would amount to a tort on the part of other de-
fendants is not still equally tortious in character, but merely that for the pro-
tection of the particular defendant, or of interests that the defendant repre-
sents, absolution from liability is granted ....
Immunities are today very much upon the wane, as the result of years of
attack from numerous legal writers, and expressed doubts on the part of
many courts.
Id. at 604-05. See, e.g., Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass'n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d
867, 871 (Ohio 1984) (abolishing charitable immunity); Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859, 868-
69 (Pa. 1981) (abolishing interspousal immunity).
5. See Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet
Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649 (1995) (discussing one proposal to limit
remedies for injuries as a way to enforce recognition of responsibilities by tort victims).
6. Kennedy Speech, supra note 1.
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decade: East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,7
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,8 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,9
and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.10 This article addresses the Court's ten-
dency to expand, rather than contract, those immunities. Part III ex-
pands in detail on those decisions and explores their impact on perpet-
uating the culture of irresponsibility among institutional actors." This
article concludes that the Court should, but has failed to, consciously
consider the culture it has helped create and the abuse of the "right" of
immunity by institutional actors it has encouraged. The Court ap-
proaches its task in the products liability and, even more broadly, tort
responsibility fields with little appreciation for the irresponsibility that
it has fostered in institutional defendants.
I. THE CULTURE OF IRRESPONSIBILITY EXPLAINED
The Supreme Court has enormous influence in many areas which
it is not empowered to affect directly simply by virtue of its position as
the highest judicial body in this society.' 2 When the Supreme Court
speaks, all people listen, not just lawyers, lawmakers, and law profes-
sors.13 People certainly are listening to the high profile cases which in-
7. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). For a discussion of East River Steamship, see infra notes
26-58 and accompanying text.
8. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). For a discussion of Boyle, see infra notes 78-117 and ac-
companying text.
9. 505 US. 504 (1992). For a discussion of Cipollone, see infra notes 223-50 and
accompanying text.
10. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). Cipollone involves the scope of federal preemption doc-
trine. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504-05. In Lohr, the Court expounded on the preemption
analysis in the context of claims involving medical devices under the Medical Device
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e, 360k(1)
(1994). For a discussion of how Lohr builds on Cipollone, see infra notes 286-309 and ac-
companying text.
11. For a discussion of the term "culture of irresponsibility," see infra note 19.
12. It is axiomatic to state that the Supreme Court is a court of limited jurisdic-
tion, competent to address only those legal issues which the grant of its authority al-
lows. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 1, 2. See JoHN E. NowAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23-34
(1978) (outlining original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
To support the idea that the Supreme Court has influence beyond the purely legal
effect of its decisions, I assume the existence of what Lawrence Friedman has called the
"mechanism or channel" of how social and legal forces affect one another. Lawrence M.
Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1581 (1989). Fried-
man explains the idea that legal and popular culture are images of each other, "help[ing]
explicate and illuminate their respective contents Id. at 1579. More importantly, Fried-
man explores a methodology for a social theory of law which "nsists... that an analy-
sis of social forces best explains why the legal system is as it is, what shapes and molds
it, what makes it ebb and flow, contract and expand; what determines its general struc-
ture, and the products that it grinds out day by day." Id. at 1581. In this article, I build
on Friedman's observation of the truism that "[flaw and legal institutions are absolutely
ubiquitous in modern society." Id. at 1587. Thus, legal decisions, particularly by the Su-
preme Court, become part of popular legal culture which "acts as a medium or channel
for transmitting values and attitudes" to the general public. Id. at 1592-93.
13. An example of the media attention to the Supreme Court's decisions is the at-
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form much of today's social and political discourse.' 4 The Court's power
to change directly society's legal landscape is self-evident; its power in-
directly to affect our cultural landscape similarly cannot be
overestimated. 15
In recent years, the scope of, and general decline in respect for,
civil responsibilities has received significant attention as a changing
aspect of our societal landscape. The Communitarian movement,
among others, has chronicled an "impoverishment of our political dis-
course" 6 resulting from an excessive focus on rights that has pre-
vented a discussion of the responsibilities that attend those rights.
17
While the Court does not have the authority to address directly civil
responsibility in the sense of generally defining the conduct to which
civil liability attaches, it does so in certain limited areas governed by
federal law.8 When it addresses civil responsibilities in these limited
tention paid to Cipollone, in which the Court decided the scope of the preemption provi-
sions of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. Cipollone, 505 US. at 504-05. That decision gar-
nered attention throughout national print and broadcast media. See, eg., Cigarette Law.
suits Get Day in Court, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1992, at Cl; Jeanne Cummings, Ruling
Opens Door to Cigarette Lawsuits, ATLANTA CONST., June 24, 1992, at A7; Arthur S.
Hayes, Plaintiff's Attorney Jumped at Chance in Cigarette Battle, WALL ST. J.. June 25,
1992, at All; Ruth Marcus, Smoking Lawsuits Permitted: The Smoke Hanging over Tort
Cases, LA Tnms, June 29, 1992, at B4; Tobacco Firms See Little Effect, WASH. POST,
June 25, 1992, at Al. While what was said in the media may not be an accurate reflec-
tion of the case as a legal matter, the media's descriptions of the case influence the be-
havior and attitudes of the general public. Friedman, supra note 12, at 1592.
14. Friedman, supra note 12, at 1598.
Changes in the law itself have been vitally important in pushing legal insti-
tutions into center stage .... Unquestionably, the great cases of the Warren
court attracted fresh attention to the judicial branch, or at least to the apex
of that branch. The Burger court made itself highly visible-and controver-
sial-when it decided Roe v. Wade
Id.
15. Put another way: "It matters how judges decide cases." RONALD DwoRN, LAW's
EMPmE 1 (1986). It matters for a number of reasons, not only to litigants, but because,
as Dworkin states:
There is inevitably a moral dimension to an action at law, and so a
standing risk of a distinct form of public injustice. A judge must decide not
just who shall have what, but who has behaved well, who has met the re-
sponsibilities of citizenship, and who by design or greed or insensitivity has
ignored his own responsibilities to others or exaggerated theirs to him.
Id. Dworkin also emphasizes one of the premises of this article, that the Supreme Court
has enormous influence on what the law is because the law is often not self-evident, nor
analytically derived, but, rather, what judges say it is. Id. at 2-6.
16. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK- THE MPOVERISHMENT OF POLITIcAL DiscouRsE
(1994). Professor Glendon is a signatory to the Communitarian Platform of Rights and
Responsibilities. See The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibili-
ties, RESPONSIVE CommuNrr, Winter 1991-92, at 4, 19.
17. GLENDON, supra note 16, at xi.
18. See, eg, Longshoreman and Harbor Workers Act, 33 US.C. §§ 901-950 (1994)
(providing compensation for harbor workers); Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 51-60 (1994) (establishing negligence liability of railroads to their workers); 46 US.C.
app. § 688 (1994) (extending the availability of negligence liability to seamen). A com-
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circumstances, the Court is providing much more than the legal reso-
lution to the issues before it. The Court's influence in creating a per-
ception of what constitutes responsible behavior goes far beyond the
parameters of the issue before it, affecting how the general public
views the scope of responsibility of different members of society.
Through this secondary influence, the Court has perpetuated a
culture in which avoiding responsibility is acceptable, at least if en-
gaged in by the large segment of society made up of institutional ac-
tors. 9 The cases from which I derive this thesis involve products liabil-
ity, the variation of tort and warranty law in which responsible
conduct has for centuries been defined by judges. Tort liability may be
considered a "state-enforced attribution of responsibility."2 0 How the
Supreme Court defines the "attributes of responsibility" in its unique
role as our leading judicial body deserves special attention as the dia-
logue over the balance between rights and responsibilities continues
unabated.
Since 1986, with its first meaningful foray into products liability,
21
the Court has directly addressed the content of tort and products lia-
bility rules on only a few occasions. 22 The Court on these occasions has
plete discussion of the scope of the responsibilities defined by the Court's interpretation
of these statutes is beyond the scope of this article.
19. For ease, I refer to products liability/tort defendants as "institutions" because
they are generally organized entities with complex decisionmaking mechanisms, fre-
quently corporations or governmental units. I also refer to all products liability defend-
ants as "producers." I recognize that there are many categories of products liability de-
fendants, including suppliers, wholesalers, manufacturers, and retailers. For the most
part, the responsibility for the product's condition belongs to the producer of the product,
not the intermediate sellers. Strict products liability was adopted in many jurisdictions
because the seller, even though not at fault, had the ability to spread the loss in a way
the injured plaintiff/victim could not. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,
441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (creating seller liability for harm to consumer);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt. a (1965). In this article's discussion of
avoiders of responsibility, it seems best to refer to the producer who could be considered
"at fault" for a defective product's condition.
20. Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering: Awareness, Participa-
tion, and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CoNxu L. RFv. 470, 495 (1993).
21. East River Steamship is the first case in which the Court had to address the
content of products liability rules. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,
476 U.S. 858 (1986). In East River Steamship, the Court discussed the policy behind
products liability rules for the first time and, specifically, was required to decide
whether products liability could attach in admiralty for solely economic loss. Id. at 874-
75. For a discussion of East River Steamship, see infra notes 26-58 and accompanying
text.
22. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 US. 504 (1992); Boyle v. United Techs.
Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). Both these cases involved the preemption of state liability
rules and the scope of federal law displacement of those rules. Boyle required the Court
to define whether federal law preempted state law where government contractors are en-
titled to a federalized defense to their liability for product design-related injuries based
on compliance with the government's design specifications. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500-01. For
a discussion of federal preemption in product design liability for government contractors,
see supra notes 78-104 and accompanying text. Cipollone required the Court to define
the scope of statutory preemption provisions and their displacement of state law liability
1996] 1079
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been influenced by the instrumentalist theory that rules of civil liabil-
ity have as their primary function the promotion of efficient conduct
and the maximization of society's welfare, usually defined in the eco-
nomic sense. The Court has chosen consistently to adopt rules that im-
munize conduct to which liability would otherwise attach under the ex-
isting applicable rules. This course protects institutional decision-
makers over individual victims and, consequently, discourages rather
than encourages responsible institutional behavior.
There are a number of explanations for these results: the Court's
increasingly conservative to centrist membership;2 reluctance to legis-
late progressive and innovative federal standards of liability;2 dedica-
tion to precedent which required these results;2 and a desire to engage
in some reverse social engineering to correct the expansion of liability
thought to have occurred since the sixties. The Court has issued opin-
ions which, taken as a whole, create a perception that irresponsibility,
at least by some, is tolerable if economic efficiency and institutional
autonomy goals are at stake. The Court's consistent choice of instru-
mental values as the fundamental basis of decisionmaking has pro-
duced a domino effect among other decisionmakers and within society
generally. Lower courts, revering the Court's analysis and paying def-
erence to it, give the Court's decisions much credence and follow them
almost blindly, even when that result is not mandated, and fail to
evaluate the effect on the overall balance of rights and responsibilities.
The end result is not one decision recognizing an immunity in a lim-
ited area of law, but a series of such decisions, creating an avalanche
rules. For a discussion of the Court's definition of statutory preemption in Cipollone, see
supra note 13 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Court's further refinement
of this analysis in Lohr, see infra notes 286-306 and accompanying text.
23. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A
FIRHAND AccouNT (1991) (discussing the effect of President Reagan's court appoint-
ments); Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731, 790-91 (1992) (positing the growing influence
of Reagan's judicial appointees as one reason for increasing defense success in products
liability cases in the late-1980s); Stephan F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit,
1989 U. IL L. REv. 399, 402 (discussing Reagan appointees' tendency to obstruct con-
gressional policy preferences, relying on plain meaning instead of legislative intent);
Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald
Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 766 (1987) (stud-
ying the conservatism of Reagan's nominees to the federal courts in relation to other Re-
publican judges).
24. The Court has often cited its deference to Congress's role as the legislative
body as a reason for its decisions. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 US. 367, 389-90 (1983) (con-
cluding a ruling was inappropriate on a federal employment contract due to an express
congressional remedy); United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Jensen, 244 US. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (relying on Congress for aid
in interpreting maritime law).
25. See generally DwoRIN, supra note 15, at 24-26 (discussing the precedent doc-
trine); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decision-
making and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 145 (1991) (describing the Supreme
Court's dynamic use of precedent).
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of immunized conduct, ever-expanding on its inevitable way to the bot-
tom where immunity is the rule rather than the exception.
II. THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY DECISIONS
The Court does not have much opportunity to address issues of
tort liability. When it does, therefore, its opinions and observations are
given increased attention. In the last decade, the Court has had more
than its usual opportunity to address issues of civil responsibility.
Therefore, how it has chosen to do so and with what results are espe-
cially significant in its cultural impact.
A East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. and Ec-
onomic Loss in Tort
Although the debate over how to resolve product-related injuries
heated up in the early 1960s and has continued over the ensuing three
decades to this day, the Court did not decide a products liability case
until 1986. In East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Ina,26 the Court was called on to decide (1) whether a strict products
liability action is cognizable in admiralty and (2) if so, whether purely
commercial economic loss is recoverable under strict products liability
principles. 27 The Court quickly, and with little discussion, decided that
strict products liability principles operated in admiralty.28 The Court,
speaking unanimously through Justice Blackmun, supported the ratio-
nale behind strict liability: to impose liability on the party best able to
protect persons from hazardous equipment.29
26. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). This case involved a dispute between the charterers of a
supertanker and the manufacturer of the tanker's turbine engines. The charterers al-
leged the million dollar engines malfunctioned during operation as a result of design and
manufacturing defects. Id. at 860-61.
27. Id. at 859. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis that
purely economic loss is not recoverable in strict products liability, and the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals afirmed. Id. at 862. The Third Circuit applied a test for determining
when purely economic damages are recoverable in strict products liability that would
have allowed recovery for damage solely to a defective product itself if the defect creates
an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property other than the product itself: Id
28. Id. at 865. The Court noted that general admiralty law is federal and devel-
oped by the judiciary, absent statute, from state and federal sources: "an amalgam of
traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules." Id.
at 864-65. Consequently, the Court's discussion of applicable principles is not limited en-
tirely to admiralty law but rather is relevant to general attitudes regarding tort respon-
sibilities. The Court's precedents relating to injuries of maritime workers had long
pointed in the direction of strict liability in the areas of unseaworthiness and breach of
implied warranty of workman-like service. Id. at 865.
29. Id. at 866. The Court noted that its precedents relating to injuries of maritime
workers logically led to the conclusion that strict products liability applied. Id. The
Court did refer, however, to Justice Traynor's famous concurring opinion which ex-
plained the many reasons supporting the adoption of strict products liability. Id. at 866-
67 (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring)).
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According to the Court, the more immediate problem was whether
there was any room left for contract principles to operate in claims
arising from defective products.30 The Court phrased the inquiry in a
telling way:
Products liability grew out of a public policy judgment that people
need more protection from dangerous products than is afforded by
the law of warranty. It is cleai, however, that if this development
were allowed to progress too far, contract law would drown in a sea
of tort. We must determine whether a commercial product injuring
itself is the kind of harm against which public policy requires manu-
facturers to protect, independent of any contractual obligations.31
This description of the "public policy judgment" which formed the basis
for products liability is a classic understatement. 32 The Court does go
on to identify what is often considered the primary goal of products li-
ability-to fix responsibility where it will most effectively reduce the
hazards inherent in defective products 33-but in doing so, the Court
clarifies that its primary purpose in identifying that goal is not to fur-
ther it, but to distinguish it from the circumstances of the present case
and limit its operation.m
One would have thought that the Court would take more time to
explore fully the policies behind an area of law that had caused tur-
moil in state courts for the previous twenty years. Perhaps the timing
of the Court's decision, twenty years after adoption of strict liability in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts,35 prevented the Court from believing
it was necessary to explore fully the additional policy bases supporting
products liability: encouraging the manufacture of safer products, com-
30. Id. at 866.
31. Id.
32. There have been numerous explanations of the policy bases of products liabil-
ity, and much debate about the priority that the competing bases have in defining sub-
stantive products liability rules. See, eg., Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX.
L. REv. 192 (1955) (analyzing theories of strict liability and negligence); W. Page Keeton,
Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329
(1966) (discussing manufacturers as risk distributors for all losses except those attribu-
table to certain known causes); William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) (discussing abrogation of the "cita-
del" of privity and the expansion of strict liability); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966) (discussing the re-
cent explosion in products liability). For further discussion of the goals of tort liability
for defective products, see Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Stan-
dard of Responsibility 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1226-30 (1993) (advocating a higher stan-
dard of responsibility for manufacturers in product design).
33. East River S.S., 476 U.S. at 866-67 (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
34. The Court states: "Obviously, damage to a product itself has certain attributes
of a products-liability claim. But the injury suffered-the failure of the product to func-
tion properly-is the essence of a warranty action, through which a contracting party
can seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain." Id. at 867-68.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965). This section contains the pri-
mary version of strict products liability used in this country.
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pensating innocent victims in non-contractual relationships with pro-
ducers, making impossible negligence cases easier to prove and thus
allocating responsibility more evenly and fairly, and acknowledging the
supremacy of consumers' expectations of product quality justified by
producers' representations of quality. It does appear shortsighted to
fail to discuss these fundamental principles in any depth and choose to
focus instead on protecting contract law from drowning in a sea of
tort.36 To the Court, twenty years of products liability decisions dis-
cussing the goals of products liability and attempting to balance those
goals boiled down to the preservation of contract law, hardly the main
concern of most products liability jurisprudence.
The Court ultimately concluded that loss to a product itself is not
the kind of harm strict products liability principles were designed to
address.3 7 In doing so, the Court discussed the approaches taken by
other jurisdictions in answering the question.38 According to the Court,
the majority approach preserved a role for the law of warranty and
prevented recovery in tort for harm solely to the product itself.39 Label-
ing this a "majority" approach overstates the state of the law at the
time; actually, very few jurisdictions had addressed the question di-
rectly. The approach designated by the Court as a "minority" had, in
fact, been adopted by a majority of the courts of appeals at that time.
That approach promoted "the safety and insurance rationales behind
strict liability"40 by allowing recovery in strict products liability for
purely economic loss, including harm to the product itself. An interme-
diate approach would have recognized recovery for injury to the prod-
uct itself if the defect which caused the loss endangered consumers as
well, but through fortuity in the specific case, did not.
41
The Court adopted what it termed the "majority approach" which
denied recovery.42 The Court relied on two themes that would recur in
its products liability opinions: that chosen responsibility standards
must enable manufacturers easily to structure their business behavior
and that limitations on damages must be maintained.4 The Court's
36. East River S.S., 476 U.S. at 867-68.
37. Id. at 871.
38. Id. at 868-70.
39. Id. at 868 (relying on Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965) (hold-
ing that preserving a proper role for warranty law precludes tort liability for pure eco-
nomic harm)).
40. Id. at 869. These courts "reject the Seely approach because they find it arbi-
trary that economic losses are recoverable if a plaintiff suffers bodily injury or property
damage, but not if a product injures itself." Id. Unlimited liability was not a concern
under this approach, according to many of the courts of appeals, because "a manufac-
turer can predict and insure against product failure." Id.
41. Id. at 869-70. This position was advocated by the court of appeals below. East
River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903, 908-10 (3d Cir. 1985).
42. East River S.S., 476 U.S. at 871.
43. Id at 870-71. The Court noted that the intermediate position, which essentially
turns, as do all cases involving negligent behavior, on the degree of risk, was too inde-
terminate to allow workable standards. Id. at 870. The Court never explains why a stan-
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choice to promote efficiency in business operations stands out starkly
against the general strict liability backdrop of manufacturer responsi-
bility for hazardous products without regard to fault. The Court dis-
cusses only briefly the nature of the manufacturer's responsibility and
defines that responsibility very narrowly. Importantly, the Court con-
cludes, not that damages should be limited for breach of a duty to
make a reasonably safe product, but that product manufacturers have
no duty to make products safe when the only injury that results is eco-
nomic loss." The Court attempts to define product-related duties dif-
ferently based on the injury which ultimately occurs; the responsibility
of a manufacturer in making and distributing its products differs de-
pending on the harm which results. 5
This begs the question of how producers are supposed to be able to
decide when their products are going to injure only themselves so they
can accommodate the different duties. The difference, of course, is not
in the duty, but rather what damages the manufacturer's tortious con-
duct must pay for, whether strict liability or negligence-based. The
Court, contrary to what it says, makes this distinction based upon the
nature of the victim and his supposed ability to acquire insurance for
such commercial losses rather than any difference in the manufac-
turer's duty.6 This, it seems to me, is putting the cart before the horse.
The nature of the responsibility to manufacture a non-defective prod-
uct would seem the same whether the product ultimately merely self-
destructs, as did the turbine engines in East River Steamship, or in-
dard based on the unreasonable risk of harm that the manufacturer created is insuffi-
ciently definite to form the basis for a tort liability standard when that is the standard
used in run-of-the-mill negligence cases. Further, the Court supports its rejection of the
intermediate approach with the more telling statement that "[e]ven when the harm to
the product itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to
repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser
to receive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the core concern of contract law." Id.
44. The Court interchangeably refers to the relevant loss as loss to the product it-
self and purely economic harm. Id. at 866-67. These are two different things; one can
have loss to the product itself leading to significant other economic loss besides mere
loss of the product. Ultimately, the Court held that "a manufacturer in a commercial re-
lationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to
prevent a product from injuring itself." Id. at 871. The Court's broad language referring
to economic harm generally reads more into this simple holding.
45. Id at 871. The Court quotes Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal.
1965):
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physi-
cal injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does
not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical
injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products.
East River S.S., 476 U.S. at 870.
46. East River S.S., 476 U.S. at 871. The Court's distinction rests on the commer-
cial user's ability to acquire insurance for commercial losses; the Court does not note the
manufacturer's equal, and perhaps superior, ability to acquire insurance because of its
ability to identify design and manufacturing defects and thus anticipate them. Id.
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jures someone or something else in the process. The tort duty arises at
the time of manufacture, not at the time of injury. To say the responsi-
bility differs with the result is a disingenuous way of creating an im-
munity from liability for conduct that would otherwise be irresponsible
to favor the economic position of the manufacturer over that of the vic-
tim, even a commercially viable one. To say that "[t]he tort concern
with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product itself" 47 is
absurd; the concern with safety is no different. The Court begins to
create the perception that irresponsible product manufacture is accept-
able when the victim is in a position to insure against it.
There may be very good reasons to limit tort recovery of plaintiffs
like those in East River Steamship. The plaintiffs were large commer-
cial companies playing for high stakes and could look out for them-
selves. 48 They had the opportunity to pay for increased warranty pro-
tection.49 Their contract damages would provide the benefit of their
bargain, arguably all that the plaintiffs were entitled to, by compen-
sating for repair costs, lost profits, and other reasonably foreseeable
consequential damages. 50 When the loss is contemplated at the time of
the contract and can be the subject of bargaining, contracting parties
should reasonably expect that the contract will govern the loss; thus it
is fair to limit them to contract remedies.51
Even given these reasons which support a limited recovery in tort
for purely economic loss, the Court writes with an unnecessarily broad
brush when it discusses the primacy of contract over tort responsibil-
ity, particularly when the loss sustained is from an unreasonably dan-
gerous and defective product and not simply from some product char-
acteristic which failed to please the purchaser with its quality or
quantity. Tort law provides recovery only for unreasonably dangerous
products,5 2 and thus the Court's refusal to recognize that tort law may
have some room to operate in this situation is unfortunate. Limiting
the manufacturer's duty in such broad terms downplays the effort of
the previous twenty years to put products liability into the tort arena,
47. Id.
48. The Court was convinced that contract and warranty law are better suited to
the type of controversy involved: commercial situations involving parties of equal bar-
gaining power who choose to allocate risk of loss in a particular way. Id. at 872-73.
49. Id.
50. The Court relies on the "more appropriate" contract law recovery to support its
decision that tort recovery is not available. Id. at 873 nn.8-9. Tort damages might tend
to overcompensate an injured commercial purchaser by providing the value of the dam-
aged product, a value which might be more than the purchaser paid, given a reduction
in price for reduced warranty coverage. Id. at 872-73.
51. Id.
52. See, eg., Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 694 P.2d 198, 206 (Ariz. 1984) (noting that a tort plaintiff must prove that
the product was unreasonably dangerous, while a contract plaintiff need only show that
the product was defective); see also RESTATEMrENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (stat-
ing manufacturers and sellers are liable for products in a "defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous" to consumers or property).
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not out of it. 3
Further, the Court confuses the tort concept of foreseeability in its
form as proximate cause with foreseeability as a limit on the duty
owed. Foreseeability of the risk has always acted as an impediment to
defining the scope of the liability. This is foreseeability in its proximate
cause sense.54 The Court considers foreseeability within proximate
cause as an inadequate limitation on the manufacturer's liability and,
thus, narrowly defines the responsibility of manufacturers in the com-
mercial loss context to exclude losses that clearly are foreseeable even
to the most jaundiced eye.55 The Court's concern. for unlimited manu-
facturer liability and purportedly efficient allocation of risk causes it to
seek not a middle ground, as did the Third Circuit in adopting an in-
termediate approach,56 but rather a more limited way to define the ob-
ligations in issue. The Court admits that tort law provides limitations
that would address some of its concerns. 57 However, the Court has
staked out its position that limitation of liability is paramount to the
products liability goals of encouraging safe products and fairly allocat-
ing loss.
55
1. Effect of East River Steamship
Since the Supreme Court decided East River Steamship, most
states addressing the question have followed it, mostly without analy-
53. For a discussion of the evolution of products liability law, see Robert L. Rabin,
Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal Change, 23 VAL. U3. L. REV. 1,
7-14 (1988).
54. East River S.S., 476 US. at 874. The Court notes that it would be difficult for a
manufacturer to take into account all foreseeable plaintiffs who may encounter the prod-
uct. Id. This, however, is a proximate cause argument, as the Court admits by citing to
Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). East River S.S., 476
U.S. at 874. When the argument is one of proximate cause, the duty question has al-
ready been answered in the affirmative and the question remains: "Are there other pub-
lic policy reasons to limit liability?" See, eg., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99,
103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is
that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbi-
trarily declines to take a series of events beyond a certain point."). The Court could have
taken this approach, much as did the court of appeals in the case below. Instead, the
Court states there is no tort duty, not that the breach of that duty has not been the
proximate cause of the harm. East River S.S., 476 U.S. at 871. This classic debate, which
Kinsman only touches upon, is best expressed in Palsgraf in the opinions of Justices
Cardozo in the majority, arguing for a duty approach, Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99-101, and
Andrews in dissent, arguing for a proximate cause approach, id. at 102-05 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
55. East River S.S., 476 US. at 874 (warning that foreseeability alone would ex-
tend a manufacturer's liability too far down the distributional chain).
56. East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903, 908 (3d Cir. 1985).
57. East River S.S., 476 U.S. at 875.
58. The Court relies for much of its support on the law and economics scholarship
of the mid-1980s. Id. at 873, 874. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRuCTU OF TORT LAW (1987); A. MITCHELL POLINsKY, AN INTRO.
DUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983).
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sis and in total deference to the Court. Prior to East River Steamship
only ten states denied recovery for loss if a product damaged only it-
self.5 9 After the Court decided East River Steamship, eighteen more
states decided to follow it.60 Several states have not yet considered the
59. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc. 548 P.2d 279, 283-86 (Alaska 1976) (holding
buyers of a defective manufactured home could not recover in tort when the only dam-
age was to the product itself) (subsequently limited by Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska 1981) (holding strict liability in tort
may apply when only the product itself is damaged if the defect also threatens other
property or persons), and Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1180
(Alaska 1993) (stating East River Steamship unjustifiably disregards safety concerns re-
sulting from defective products)); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149-51 (Cal.
1965) (holding that strict liability in tort applies to injury to person or property other
than the defective product, but not to economic injury alone); Salmon River Sportsman
Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 544 P.2d 306, 309-11 (Idaho 1976) (denying recovery
to buyer of airplane for damages sustained to aircraft due to mechanical failure due to
lack of privity and noting distinction between personal injury, property damage, and eco-
nomic loss); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 771 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
Indiana state court would deny tort recovery for purely economic losses); Diatom, Inc. v.
Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1581 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that Kansas law denied
tort recovery to commercial purchaser of rotary vacuum dryers for purely economic loss);
Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co., 581 F. Supp. 1514, 1539 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding manu-
facturer of antilock brake systems could not recover from component manufacturer in
tort for purely economic losses); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d
159, 162 (Minn. 1981) (holding commercial purchaser of hot plate press could not recover
in tort when cylinder failed and only damage was to press itself); Schiavone Constr. Co.
v. Elgood Mayo Corp., 436 N.E.2d 1322, 1323 (N.Y. 1982) (denying recovery in strict
products liability to remote purchaser of defective truck hoist when purchaser suffered
only economic loss and the product was not unduly dangerous); Maru Shipping Co. v.
Burmeister & Wain Am. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 210, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding ship-
owner who did not allege personal injury or damage to other property as a result of de-
fective parts in auxiliary vessel engines could not recover in tort); Hart Eng'g Co. v.
FMC Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1471, 1481-83 (D.R.I. 1984) (holding that purchaser of admit-
tedly defective clarifiers could not recover in tort when defect did not create an unrea-
sonable risk of danger and only injury was failure to meet consumer expectations); Mid
Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 312-13
(Tex. 1978) (denying tort recovery for damages to product itself to purchaser of rebuilt
airplane that crashed due to the seller's failure to attach a crankshaft gear bolt lock
plate when the engine was overhauled). Each of these jurisdictions followed the Califor-
nia Seely decision, as did the Court in East River Steamship. Some jurisdictions looked
at
the nature of the defect and the manner in which the damage occurred before
allowing a plaintiff to recover for damage to the product .... The underly-
ing rationale for this inquiry is that when a product creates a risk of per-
sonal injury, liability should not depend on whether or not the victim is actu-
ally injured.
Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for Asbestos Removal Costs, 73 OR. L. REv. 505, 525-
26, 550 nn.162-65 (1993).
Interestingly, a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision discussing the Cali-
fornia rule from Seely notes that the United States Supreme Court "gave Seely a broader
reading than its holding." Aris Helicopters, Ltd. v. Allison Gas Turbine, 932 F.2d 825,
827 (9th Cir. 1991) (Thompson, J., concurring). The concurring opinion further states:
"[I]t is well to bear in mind the old adage that the Court is not last because it is infalli-
ble; rather, it is infallible because it is last." Id.
60. Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 543 So. 2d 671, 672-74 (Ala. 1989)
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(overruling previous case allowing recovery for purely economic harm); McKernan v.
United Techs., 717 F. Supp. 60, 66 (D. Conn. 1989) (finding East River Steamship per-
suasive); Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Del. 1992) (holding ec-
onomic loss doctrine completely bars recovery for product itself in tort); Airport Rent-A-
Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc., 660 So. 2d 628, 631 (Fla. 1995) (deciding economic loss not
recoverable even when damage was sudden and calamitous and when plaintiff had no
alternative remedy); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d
899, 902 (Fla. 1987) (stating economic loss not recoverable with accompanying claim of
injury); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (D. Haw.
1993) (finding East River Steamship controlling); Miller's Bottled Gas Inc. v. Borg-
Warner Corp., 955 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding economic loss alone not
recoverable in tort under Kentucky law); Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613
N.E.2d 92, 93 (Mass. 1993) (holding purely economic loss unrecoverable in tort absent
personal injury or property damage); East Miss. Elec. Power v. Porcelain Prods. Co., 729
F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (directly accepting East River Steamship in purely
economic loss); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc., 815 P.2d 601,
604 (Nev. 1991) (holding damage to product itself not recoverable in tort even though
other property and persons subject to unreasonable harm from product defect); Public
Serv. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 1281, 1284-85 (D.N.H. 1988) (holding
damage to product itself not compensable in tort); Cooperative Power Ass'n v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 493 N.W.2d 661, 663-65 (N.D. 1992) (holding no liability for economic
loss if machine sold in commercial transaction); Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. American
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 1987 WL 18014 (Ohio App. 1987) (denying recovery in tort for mere
product damage), aff'd in part, 537 N.E.2d 624, 635 (Ohio 1989) (affirming no recovery
for pure economic loss); Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 808 P.2d 649,
651 (Okla. 1991) (holding no tort action for product injury alone); REM Coal Co. v. Clark
Equip. Co., 563 A.2d 128, 132 (Pa. 1989) (denying tort recovery for damage to product it-
self); Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 580 (Utah App. 1994)
(holding purely economic loss not recoverable in negligence); Vermont Plastics, Inc. v.
Brine, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 444, 449 (D. Vt. 1993) (predicting Vermont Supreme Court
would follow East River Steamship, at least when plaintiff was commercial buyer), aff'd,
79 F.3d 272, 281 (2d Cir. 1996); D'Huyvetter v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 475
N.W.2d 587, 594-95 (Wis. App. 1991) (disallowing tort claim if product damages only it-
self), rev. denied, 475 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. 1991); City of LaCrosse v. Schubert, Schroeder &
Assocs., 240 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Wis. 1976) (appearing to be contradicted by D'Huyvetter by
suggesting party may recover under strict liability for pure economic loss); Continental
Ins. v. Page Eng'g Co., 783 P.2d 641, 649 (Wyo. 1989) (holding economic loss not recover-
able for damage to product itself).
In American Xyrofin, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 595 N.E.2d 650 (Ill. Ct. App.
1992), the Illinois court seemed to agree with the foundation of East River Steamship,
but ultimately concluded the instant case was outside its scope because damage occurred
to property other than the product itself. Id. at 656; see also Trans States Airlines v.
Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc., 875 F Supp. 522, 525 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding plaintiff could
seek recovery for economic loss along with property and personal injury damage if prod-
uct damage was the result of sudden and calamitous breakdown). In Carolina Winds
Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 897, 901-06 (S.C. App. 1988), the
South Carolina court discussed the "economic loss rule" in the context of an allegedly de-
fective dwelling and appeared to favor the concept, relying partially on Seely, but did not
discuss East River Steamship. Shortly thereafter, the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
jected Carolina Winds to the extent that it advocated a complete denial of tort recovery
for new home buyers who suffered pure economic loss. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber &
Mfg. Co., 384 S.E.2d 730, 736-37 (S.C. 1989). In Kennedy, the court held that, in the new
home context, the "economic loss rule" would apply if a builder breached a purely con-
tractual duty. Id. at 737. However, if the builder breached a legal duty, such as con-
structing a house that posed a serious risk of physical harm, the injured home buyer
TORT LIABILITY IMMUNITY
issue, but few states that have addressed the issue since East River
Steamship have declined to follow the Court's lead.61 Many of these
opinions are federal court cases based on diversity of citizenship juris-
diction; the Supreme Court's influence is formidable in this circum-
stance.62 One can only surmise that had the Supreme Court taken a
more moderate approach, recognizing that its rule may only be appro-
priate in commercial, non-consumer goods transactions, jurisdictions
which had yet to rule on the matter would also have taken a more
moderate approach.
could sue in tort even if only the house was damaged. Id.
61. The District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia have not addressed
the issue, in part because some do not recognize strict products liability. Some states
continue to adhere to the minority position which allows recovery for purely economic
loss when the product injures only itself. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 323
(Ark. 1981) (allowing buyers of house with defective carpet to sue builder in strict liabil-
ity); Sherman -. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499 (D. Md. 1990) (lim-
iting East River Steamship to commercial settings). No state has addressed the issue by
statute.
Alaska, which followed Seely at one time, has since narrowed its approach and ex-
pressly declined to follow the East River Steamship approach in Pratt & Whitney Can.,
Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1180 (Alaska 1993) (holding that damage to defective
product itself may be recovered in strict liability if persons or other property are also en-
dangered). The court rejected East River Steamship, stating. "We think, however, that
any gain in certainty from a per se rule against economic loss is bought at too high a
price: decreased safety and consumer protection." Id. at 1180. The court further noted
that East River Steamship fails to protect consumers who lack equal bargaining power
and are thus inadequately protected by contract law. Id. The court describes the diver-
sity of opinion in the area, noting that an intermediate approach, which East River
Steamship rejected, "[reflects] not only the developing direction of case law but socially
appropriate engineered philosophy directed toward better product and a safer environ-
ment . . . . Confining recovery to contractual remedies makes no real sense." Id. at
1180-81 (citing Continental Ins. v. Page Eng'g Co., 783 P.2d 641, 684-85 (Wyo. 1989)
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting)).
Also rejecting East River Steamship are Washington, Washington Water Power Co. v.
Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199, 1208-09 (Wash. 1989) (choosing a risk of harm analy-
sis to accommodate the safety and risk-spreading policies of products liability), and West
Virginia, Capitol Fuels, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 382 S.E.2d 311, 312-13 (W. Va. 1989)
(allowing recovery for economic loss when property damage to defective product results
from calamitous event).
62. For example, in New York, which followed Seely, federal district courts have
held that the New York Court of Appeals would follow East River Steamship if given the
chance. See, e.g., Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 840 F. Supp. 231
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (expressing belief that New York Court of Appeals would apply East
River Steamship); Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, Inc., 785 F. Supp 363,
365-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the East River Steamship principle to consumer rather
than commercial setting). In Bellevue South Assocs. v. HRH Constr. Corp., 579 N.E.2d
195 (N.Y. 1991), the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the state of the law in the
area and confirmed its adherence to what it described as the intermediate approach of
Seely, concluding that there was no need to adopt the more restrictive East River Steam-
ship approach in that case. Id. at 198-200; see also Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195, 1196-98 (N.Y. 1995) (adopting East River Steamship for con-
tractually-based economic losses, including injury to the product itself, in arms-length
"as is" transaction involving purchase from subsequent owner of the product).
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New Jersey stands alone in following the minority position al-
lowing recovery for economic loss in strict liability. 3 It was this posi-
tion that the Supreme Court rejected in favor of its more restrictive li-
ability rule.64 Even after the Supreme Court issued East River
Steamship, New Jersey has refused to adopt it.65 Although federal
courts have found East River Steamship persuasive and applied it to
cases based on New Jersey law,66 New Jersey courts still refuse to
adopt the East River Steamship approach.
2. The culture of irresponsibility illustrated
A particularly enlightening opinion on the effect East River Steam-
ship has had on perpetuating a culture of irresponsibility is Richard
O'Brien Cos. v. Challenge-Cook Bros.,67 from the United States District
Court in Colorado. Plaintiffs were the purchasers and lessees of alleg-
edly defective concrete pumps made by the defendant. 68 In granting
summary judgment for the defendant, the district court decided to dis-
regard a prior Colorado Supreme Court case that had held purely eco-
nomic loss recoverable in tort.69 The district court said that since the
Supreme Court of the United States had decided East River Steam-
ship, an admiralty case based on federal law, the Colorado Supreme
63. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 312-13 (N.J. 1965) (holding
manufacturer's duty to make non-defective products allows recovery for injury to product
itself). This holding was later narrowed, pre-East River Steamship, in Spring Motors
Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J. 1985), to exclude commercial
transactions, a fair compromise position which recognizes the importance of the inequal-
ity of bargaining power between consumers and product manufacturers. For a discussion
of courts following an intermediate approach to allow recovery for some economic losses
depending on the risk of harm involved in the product's defect, see supra note 61 and ac-
companying text.
64. East River S.S., 476 U.S. at 870.
65. See, ag., People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 117
(N.J. 1985) (allowing recovery for economic injury without physical harm if the defend-
ant knows or should know injury could occur); Unifoil Corp. v. CNA Ins. Co., 528 A.2d
47, 51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding strict liability claim subsumed within
warranty claim and economic losses recoverable); Livingston Bd. of Educ. v. United
States Gypsum Co., 592 A.2d 653 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (holding under Santor
and Spring Motors that recovery for economic loss was permitted for asbestos removal).
66. McConnell v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 646 F. Supp. 1520, 1525-26 (D.N.J. 1986)
(holding "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under negligence or
strict liability to prevent a product from injuring itself," relying on East River
Steamship).
67. 672 R Supp. 466, 472 (D. Colo. 1987) (disallowing damages for pure economic
loss under East River Steamship).
68. Id. at 467.
69. Id at 471-72. In Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975), the
Colorado Supreme Court decided that the purchaser of a motor home which was dam-
aged allegedly by defects in the product itself could recover in strict liability for the
damage to the product sold. Id. at 989. The Hiigel court had followed the New Jersey
case, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965), one of the first
cases holding economic loss was recoverable in strict products liability. Hiigel, 544 P.2d
at 989.
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Court's decision necessarily must be questioned since it was decided
prior to East River Steamship.70 East River Steamship did not control
the case before the court because the Colorado case was based on di-
versity of citizenship, governed by state law under the Erie doctrine.71
The effect of East River Steamship, according to the district court,
compelled the conclusion that a Colorado Supreme Court opinion on
point could be disregarded. 2 The court noted that it was not usurping
the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion; it just "cuts the edge of the de-
cision very finely."7 3 The district court was clearly consumed with fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's opinion, finding that East River Steamship
"makes perfect sense conceptually"74 as well as practically,7" even
though it was facially inapplicable.
As mentioned earlier, good reasons exist to limit recovery for
purely economic loss to contractual allocation. 76 Those reasons, how-
ever, do not apply when the highest court of the state whose law gov-
erns the action says otherwise. East River Steamship defined only a
rule operating in admiralty law, but has affected other products liabil-
ity areas in which it does not directly operate. The philosophical basis
for the decision has carried great weight. Courts deciding the issue
rely almost exclusively on East River Steamship with no analysis of
feasible alternatives. Further, the circumstances presented in many of
the cases relying on East River Steamship do not involve equal bar-
gainers in non-admiralty or commercial transactions and often involve
consumer transactions where the unreasonably dangerous nature of
the product could well have caused serious harm to persons and
property.
7
B. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. and the Government Contractor
Defense
Building on the theme of immunizing irresponsible conduct is the
Court's 1986 decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,78 in which
70. Richard O'Brien Cos., 672 F. Supp. at 472.
71. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 US. 64 (1938).
72. Richard O'Brien Cos., 672 F. Supp. at 472. In addition, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court had narrowed the effect of Santor in a subsequent case, and the district
court was persuaded by this development as well. Id. (citing Spring Motors v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 471. The court goes on to say that imposing a tort remedy in a situation
which involved "the principal concern and function of the law of contract-the protection
of the legitimately bargained expectations of the parties"-would produce not only uncer-
tainty but represents "a radical undercurrent which threatens to subvert the very con-
cept of predetermined risk allocation." Id.
75. Id
76. For a discussion of reasons to limit tort recovery for pure economic loss to con-
tractual allocation, see supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of cases denying tort recovery for pure economic loss where
parties have unequal bargaining power, see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
78. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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the Court had its first opportunity to address products liability in a
non-admiralty context. Boyle required the Court to address an actual
standard-setting issue, an arguably more difficult issue than that in
East River Steamship, which called for the type of line-drawing regard-
ing liability more typical of common law judges making policy choices.
Boyle asked the Court to decide a purely responsibility-defining issue:
whether a product manufacturer should be responsible for a defective
product design when it complied with government contract design
specifications.79 Defining design defect standards has caused signifi-
cant difficulty for the judiciary over the last twenty years.80 Conse-
quently, the Court's first opinion on the issue predictably met with
great interest8 l and had a predictably significant impact on the culture
of irresponsibility.
Boyle sought clarification of the availability and scope of the gov-
ernment contractor defense in a products liability action involving mil-
itary equipment. The plaintiff was a Marine flyer who died when the
escape hatch in the Sikorsky helicopter he was piloting failed to open
after the helicopter crashed.8 2 Unlike East River Steamship which was
governed by federal admiralty law, Boyle was governed by state tort
law since it involved private civil litigation with no federal question.
The Supreme Court was asked to determine if federal law preempted
state law in defining the applicable liability standards for the manu-
facturer's design flaws.8 The defendant contractor argued that under
federal law it could not be held liable for the defective escape hatch be-
cause the contract under which the helicopter was supplied to the mili-
tary specified the design and, therefore, the contractor was just follow-
ing government orders.84
79. Id. at 502-04.
80. For a discussion of the debate over how to define the standard of liability for
defective designs, see supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT
(THiRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LL;Biurry (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1996) (attempting to define
design defect standards); David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the 'Strict"
Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL L. REV. 743.
81. A number of articles had addressed the government contractor defense prior to
Boyle in an attempt to resolve when such a defense might be applicable. See, e.g.,
Richard Ausness, Surrogate Immunity: The Government Contract Defense and Products
Liability, 47 Omo ST. LJ. 985, 996-1003 (1986) (recounting history and widespread ac-
ceptance of government contractor defense).
82. Boyle, 487 US. at 502-03. Plaintiff was not killed in the crash, but he drowned
because he could not get out of the crashed helicopter; the escape hatch opened out and
would not fuiction because of the water pressure after it was submerged. Id. at 503.
Plaintiff recovered on a jury verdict against the helicopter's manufacturer, but the
Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with directions that judgment be entered for Si-
korsky because, in part, the government contractor defense prevented imposition of lia-
bility based on federal law. Id.
83. Id. at 504-05.
84. Id. at 503-04, 506. This defense has been variously described as the "govern-
ment contractor" defense, id. at 510, the "military contractor" defense, id. at 500, the
"contract specifications" defense, Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 739
(11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988), "the government made me do it" de-
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The Court first addressed whether there was any basis for federal
law to preempt state law in the area of design standards.85 There was
no federal statute which expressly preempted state law in the area,
nor was there a direct conflict between applicable federal and state
law.86 The Court thus had to turn to the third circumstance in which it
had found preemption of state law: whether the issue involved
"uniquely federal interests" so that, even absent a congressional direc-
tive or a direct conflict between federal and state law, federal law
must displace state law.
87
The Court identified two unique federal interests at play: the obli-
gations and rights of the United States under its contracts and the
civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their
duties.88 Both of these interests were only indirectly present in this
products liability case which involved breach of a tort duty by the pri-
vate manufacturer defendant and a private plaintiff8s9 The Court took
great pains to point out that the federal government's interest was im-
plicated in this suit even though the dispute was between private par-
ties.90 The interest implicated is the one alluded to in East River
Steamship: preventing an increased cost of doing business through un-
limited liability.91 The Court, consistent with its East River Steamship
focus on preserving the role of contract, elevated the importance of the
government procurement contract and the relationship between gov-
ernment and contractor over the manufacturer's responsibility to the
victim.
92
fense, In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1990), and
the "I was only following orders" defense, R. Joel Ankney, Note, "But I Was Only Follow-
ing Orders": The Government Contractor Defense in Environmental Tort Litigation, 32
WMt. & MARY L. REv. 399 (1991).
85. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504, 512.
86. Id. at 504.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 504-05. Cf. id. at 521-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating the govern-
ment interests identified are collateral at best to the action and thus the federal interest
in the "discretionary function exception" to governmental immunity does not extend to
that relationship).
89. Id. at 502-03.
90. Id. at 506-07. The Court attempted to distinguish previous cases that had re-
fused to find a unique federal interest when the case involved private parties even
though a federal government contract served as the basis for the dispute. Id. (discussing
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956) and Miree v. DeKalb
County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977)). Justice Brennan pointed out to the Court that the interests
in these two cases were at least comparable to that in Boyle, and thus indistinguishable,
supporting not finding a unique federal interest to preempt state law. Id. at 519-22
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 507. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 US.
858, 874-75 (1986) (discussing the impact of unlimited liability on business costs). For a
discussion of the impact of unlimited liability, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying
text.
92. Boyle, 487 US. at 507.
1996] 1093
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Once the Court found a unique federal interest which might jus-
tify preemption, the Court had to determine if there was indeed a "sig-
nificant conflict" between that interest and state law that would re-
quire displacement of state law.93 The area of "significant conflict"
which most courts of appeals had evaluated when determining the
scope of state law displacement, and thus the content of applicable fed-
eral law, was the Feres doctrine "under which the Federal Torts Claims
Act (FTCA) does not cover injuries to Armed Services personnel in the
course of military service"94 The Court, recognizing that the Feres doc-
trine would limit liability only in the military injury context, declined
to adopt the Feres doctrine as the basis for defining the area of state
law displacement.95
The Court recognized the basis of the conflict instead to be the
"discretionary function exception" to the FTCA's grant of sovereign im-
munity to government officials and agencies. 96 The Court said that al-
lowing suits against third-party government contractors would produce
the same effect on the federal government sought to be avoided by the
FTCA exemption-judicial second-guessing of federal official judgments
through state tort suits.9 7 As foreshadowed by East River Steamship,
93. Id. The Court states that the presence of a uniquely federal interest "merely
establishes a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of state law." Id.
94. Id. at 510 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)).
95. The Court stated:
We do not adopt this analysis because it seems to us that the Feres doctrine,
in its application to the present problem, logically produces results that are
in some respects too broad and in some respects too narrow. Too broad, be-
cause if the Government contractor defense is to prohibit suit against the
manufacturer whenever Feres would prevent suit against the Government,
then even injuries caused to military personnel by a helicopter purchased
from stock. . . or by any standard equipment purchase by the Government,
would be covered . . . . On the other hand, reliance on Feres produces (or
logically should produce) results that are in another respect too narrow. Since
that doctrine covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused by
the military to civilians, it could not be invoked to prevent, for example, a ci-
vilian's suit against the manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state tort
theory, claiming harm from what is alleged to be needlessly high levels of
noise produced by the jet engines.
Id. at 510-11.
96. Id. at 511. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994) (excepting
from consent to suit "[a]ny claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the fail-
ure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused"). For a discussion of the scope of the exception, see Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1953) ("It also includes determinations made by executives or admin-
istrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion."). For a post-Boyle discussion
of the exception, see Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) and United States v.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991). See generally Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion: Ju-
dicial Interpretation of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 47 ME. L. REV. 365 (1995) (discussing the "discretionary function exception" to the
Federal Tort Claims Act).
97. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. The Court does not elaborate on the types of functions
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the Court relies for its conclusion on the potential that the "financial
burden of judgments against the contractors would ultimately be
passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United States itself,
since defense contractors will predictably raise their prices to cover, or
to insure against, contingent liability for the Government-ordered
designs
98
The Court defined the elements of the defense which protects de-
fectively designed products:99
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed,
pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasona-
bly precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those spec-
ifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the
dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier
but not to the United States.
100
The Court believed that these elements insured that the design being
challenged was one considered by the government and therefore in-
volved the exercise of a discretionary fumction. 10
The Court specifically rejected a more pro-recovery test 0 2 which
would preclude suit only if (1) the contractor did not participate, or
participated only minimally, in the product's design; or (2) the contrac-
tor warned the government of the risks of the design, identified alter-
native designs reasonably known by it, and the government clearly au-
thorized the dangerous design anyway.10 3 The Court's reason for
rejecting this less broad immunity, one which would have placed
greater responsibility on participating contractors to identify risks and
design alternatives, is consistent with its focus in East River Steam-
ship on protecting the manufacturer from tort liability.
that have been found to be discretionary but quickly concludes that the selection of the
appropriate design for military equipment is one. Id. Justice Brennan, in his dissent,
notes that the "discretionary function exception" has never been so broadly construed as
to include independent contractors like the defendant:
The immunity we have recognized has extended no further than a subset of
"officials of the Federal Government" and has covered only "discretionary"
functions within the scope of their legal authority. Never before have we so
much as intimated that the immunity (or the "uniquely federal interest" that
justifies it) might extend beyond that narrow class to cover also nongovern-
ment employees.
Id. at 522-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 511-12.
99. Id. at 512. The Court agreed with the scope of displacement adopted by the
Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts even though those cases relied on the Feres doctrine as
the area of significant conflict which required displacement. Id. (citing Boyle v. United
Techs. Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986) and McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 704 F.2d
444 (9th Cir. 1983)).
100. Id
101. Id.
102. Id. at 513 (referring to Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th
Cir. 1985)).
103. Id.
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While this formulation may represent a perfectly reasonable tort
rule, it is not a rule designed to protect the federal interest embod-
ied in the "discretionary function exception." The design ultimately
selected may well reflect a significant policy judgment by Govern-
ment officials whether or not the contractor rather than those offi-
cials developed the design. In addition, it does not seem to us sound
policy to penalize, and thus deter, active contractor participation in
the design process, placing the contractor at risk unless it identifies
all design defects. 104
The Court's rationale in Boyle is a poignant example of its perpet-
uation of a culture of irresponsibility. The government contractor de-
fense is a tort rule-it is a rule of immunity developed to prevent the
unfair imposition of liability on actors whose conduct is controlled con-
tractually by another with superior knowledge and expertise. 10 5 No one
would say with a straight face that military contractors like McDon-
nell Douglas, Boeing, and General Dynamics have knowledge and ex-
pertise inferior to that of the government procurement and design offi-
cials with whom they contract for such sophisticated weaponry as
helicopters and fighter planes. If anything, the military contractors
have a cadre of highly trained and paid expert engineers in their em-
ploy with far superior knowledge and expertise than their military
counterparts, many of whom are probably career military or govern-
ment bureaucrats. Further, to say that government contractors will be
deterred from engaging in the government contract business and from
participating in the design process fails to recognize the cash cow that
is the United States Department of Defense. 10 6 And the idea of placing
a military contractor "at risk" for a design defect implies that such in-
stitutions are in need of protection from increased risk and are incapa-
ble of allocating it or anticipating it, in a way that Lieutenant Boyle
and his family somehow were capable. The Court's choice to protect
United Technologies over Lieutenant Boyle is proof positive that the
Court is more concerned with the economic welfare of the institutional
defendant over the innocent victim.
104. Id.
105. This reason is reflected in the earlier cases which involved public works con-
tracts and an agency relationship between contractor and contractee in order for the de-
fense to arise. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940); see also RESTATE.
MEN'r (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 404 cmt. a (1965) (noting that a contractor will generally not
be liable for faulty specifications or materials provided by his employer); Ausness, supra
note 81, at 993 (noting applicability of the contract specification defense in private em-
ployment cases and observing: "The assumption behind this rule is that an ordinary con-
tractor does not have sufficient skill to evaluate design specifications provided by an em-
ployer and must rely on the employer's superior knowledge and expertise.").
106. This is, after all, one of the few federal government agencies whose budget
the new 104th Congress, with its Republican majority, planned to increase under its
Contract with America. H.R. 10, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Further, the extraordinary
increase in federal spending for the Department of Defense in the 1980s is well-
documented. To suggest that military contractors will be deterred from contracting with
the Department of Defense because of a little tort liability is, at best, misinformed.
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The Court had previously restricted the circumstances in which
sovereign immunity operated to those in which "the contributions of
immunity to effective government in particular contexts outweigh the
perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens" 10 7 because immunity
"contravenes the basic tenet that individuals be held accountable for
their wrongful conduct."0 8 The Court had struck a balance between
the extension of immunity and the protection needed to encourage ef-
fective administration of government by narrowly defining the reach of
the discretionary function exception. 0 9 In Boyle, the Court bucks its
previous approach almost entirely because of the mere possibility that
government contractors will pass liability costs onto the government. It
is by no means clear that costs will be avoided under the Court's rul-
ing; in fact, greater costs in human life and limb will most certainly be
sustained from the unreasonably dangerous and unsafe products that
will result. Further, it is not at all clear that tort liability will inter-
fere with government policymaking.
The Court's decision to extend an otherwise narrowly construed
immunity to government contractors because of the possible indirect
burden on governmental functions indicates the Court's conscious
choice to benefit institutional actors--corporate defendants and the
government included-with protection from otherwise tortious conduct,
a choice similarly promoted in East River Steamship. A concern over
unlimited liability is not undeserving of attention. Rather, it is one
concern of many that the Court must consider in evaluating the com-
peting interests at issue. Once the Court decided that there was a
uniquely federal interest at stake,"0 its refusal to consider the counter-
vailing interests supporting tort liability (compensation, fair allocation
of loss and deterrence, among others) perpetuates the "culture" that
institutional defendants have a "right" to be irresponsible when it
comes to manufacturing products."'
107. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Doe v. McMillan, 412
U.S. 306, 320 (1973)).
108. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Westfall v. Ervin, 484 U.S. 292, 295
(1988)).
109. Id. at 522-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. This conclusion is not self-evident and certainly is the subject of debate. Id. at
519-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. The tort system is premised on the assumption that the imposition of li-
ability encourages actors to prevent any injury whose expected cost exceeds
the cost of prevention. If the system is working as it should, Government con-
tractors will design equipment to avoid certain injuries (like the deaths of
soldiers or Government employees), which would be certain to burden the
Government. The Court therefore has no basis for its assumption that tort l-
ability will result in a net burden on the Government (let alone a clearly ex-
cessive net burden) rather than a net gain.
Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan further disagrees with the Court's decision to address the issue at
all, believing that it is an issue for Congress, not the Court. "Perhaps tort liability is an
inefficient means of ensuring the quality of design efforts, but '[w]hatever the merits of
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The Court further encouraged "abuse of the right" to immunity by
refusing to choose an intermediate position in defining the government
contractor defense, one which would have accommodated the concern
for protecting military decisionmaking while providing some protection
to the victims of defective products. There is an area in which a fed-
eral government contractor defense reasonably should operate to pre-
vent a contractor who works with the government from bearing all the
loss attendant to performing a contract the way the government re-
quired it to be performed. The Courts definition of the defense, how-
ever, provides too much protection for a class of institutions not need-
ing it.lu
The Court's defense overprotects the federal interest in official im-
munity for discretionary functions and that breadth compounds the
perception of tolerable irresponsibility the Court has created.113 The of-
ficial immunity potentially applies not only to specially ordered mili-
tary equipment like the helicopter in this case, but to "any made-to-
order gadget" that the federal government might purchase after some
cursory review of plans--"from the Challenger to the Postal Service's
old mail cars."114 Several post-Boyle cases have involved this question
and most have extended Boyle's government contractor defense to run-
of-the-mill civilian products the government purchases, even if unre-
lated to the discretionary choice of military might over safety.1 5 Boyle
could apply to civilians injured by a government contractor's product
designed for the military, as the Court clearly intends."5 Further, it
could apply even if the government has not intentionally sacrificed
the policy' the Court wishes to implement, 'its conversion into law is a proper subject for
congressional action, not for any creative power of ours.'" Id. (quoting United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 314-15 (1947)). Congress had declined on several occa-
sions to provide a government contractor defense in spite of pressure by military con-
tractors to do so. Id. at 515 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Justice Brennan's dissent provides an eloquent explanation of why the Court
has gone too far in the definition of the defense. Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Brennan calls the Court's conclusion "an injustice" and "breathtakingly sweeping."
Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Apropos of the unjustified breadth of the defense is
Congress's refusal to legislate such a defense in the face of "a sustained campaign by
government contractors to create some defense." Id. at 515 & n.1 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
113. Justice Brennan observes that the grant of immunity would not enhance the
"fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government" because (a)
the threat of suit is not likely to influence the conduct of an industrial giant, (b) the gov-
ernment contractor role is devoted largely to assessing how to satisfy government's
needs and not to setting policy, and (c) government contractor suits would rarely "con-
sume time and energy" that would otherwise be devoted to governmental service. Id. at
523-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 516 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
115. For a discussion of this extension of the government contractor defense, see
infra notes 152-80 and accompanying text.
116. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510-11. For post-Boyle cases so holding, see Ramey v. Mar-
tin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629 (5th
Cir. 1989); Nicholson v. United Techs. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 598 (D. Conn. 1988).
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safety for other interests like speed or efficiency, and even if the equip-
ment is not of a type typically considered dangerous.117
1. Expansion of Boyle under the culture of irresponsibility
There are a number of examples of both the way in which Boyle
has been expanded and the impact felt on the culture of acceptable ir-
responsibility the Court has created. These areas of expansion fall into
three categories: (1) extension of the government contractor defense to
warning and manufacturing defects even though Boyle is, on its face,
limited to design defects; (2) extension of the defense to non-military
government contractors for everyday civilian products in non-military
settings; and (3) expansive readings of the "reasonably precise specifi-
cations" 118 and warning requirements of Boyle to include circumstances
not within the reach of Boyle's discretionary function rationale.
a. Extension to non-design defects. Boyle involved an alleged de-
sign defect." 9 Product design decisions involve making choices between
a great many alternatives based on costs, material availability, com-
mercial practicability, consumer acceptance, and product use, among
others. 20 The "discretionary function exception" to the FTCA relied on
in Boyle is implicated, if at all, in the discretion exercised in making
those product design choices, particularly in military products. 1' Logi-
cally, therefore, the rationale behind Boyle should limit its operation to
design defects vhere official government discretion may be exercised in
creating the reasonably precise design specifications which the govern-
ment contractor is bound to follow.12 Unfortunately, this logical result
has not obtained and many courts have extended Boyle to both manu-
facturing and warning defects.1
3
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed whether Boyle
should be extended to manufacturing defects in Harduvel v. General
Dynamics Corp.24 The plaintiff was killed when the F16 aircraft he
117. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 512.
119. Id. at 501.
120. For a discussion of the factors and influences involved in making product de-
sign decisions, see Davis, supra note 32, at 1235-48 (explaining the changes in products
liability law over the past four decades that have greatly increased an injured plaintiff's
chances for recovery). See also Theodore S. Jankowski, Focusing on Quality and Risk:
The Central Role of Reasonable Alternatives in Evaluating Design and Warning Deci-
sions, 36 S. TFx L. REV. 283, 311-26 (1995) (discussing various factors that influence
product manufacturing and design decisions).
121. For a discussion of the government contractor defense and discretionary deci-
sionmaking in the non-military product context, see infra notes 151-80 and accompany-
ing text.
122. See, eg., Sundstrom v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 816 F. Supp. 587, 590 (N.D.
Cal. 1993).
123. For a discussion of cases extending Boyle to manufacturing and warning de-
fects, see infra notes 124-150 and accompanying text.
124. 878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030 (1990). Retired As-
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was piloting crashed.'2 The crash destroyed the aircraft, and the cause
of the crash was indeterminate.u 6 The jury found a manufacturing de-
fect based on an inference of defect allowable under Florida law when
it is not possible for the product involved to be inspected because it
was destroyed in the accident. 7 Soon after the jury returned its ver-
dict for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court issued Boyle. Retired Associ-
ate Justice Powell analyzed Boyle to determine its applicability to
manufacturing defects.'
First, the Harduvel court concluded that whether a defect was one
of design or manufacture was no longer a question of state law but
rather federal common law because Boyle governed the type of defect
involved.129 The court observed that Boyle recognized a "broad formula-
tion" of the defense. 130 In light of that, the court concluded that the in-
ference of a manufacturing defect raised by Florida law was inoperable
and that federal law required an investigation of the type of defect
present based on the protection of discretionary functions for which
the defense was intended.131 The court, consistent with its broad read-
ing of Boyle, expanded the category of defects which were included in
the defense and excluded only those product defects reflecting "shoddy
workmanship" 13 2 The court noted that if the "defect is one inherent in
the product or system that the government has approved, it will be
covered by the defense."
133
Consequently, manufacturing flaws which arise in the production
of all products, because there is no such thing as 100 percent quality
in the manufacture of anything (including F16 aircraft), are now pro-
tected from liability. These flaws are "inherent in the product," 134 in
the Harduvel sense, because they are the natural byproduct of the pro-
duction process. These flaws are the raison d'etre of strict products lia-
bility, and certainly not the type of product design feature that govern-
ment officials consciously choose in the way that the design feature in
Boyle was chosen. No balancing of safety versus combat effectiveness
is involved in such product features. On the contrary, these features
are not chosen at all, but rather happen by default because of the na-
ture of all production systems. To include such flaws in the scope of
Boyle's defense reverts the state of products liability to its pre-1960
sociate Justice Lewis Powell, sitting by designation, wrote the opinion. Id.
125. Id at 1313.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1315.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1317.
130. Id. at 1315.
131. Id. at 1317. Of course, the plaintiff did not know what type of defect caused
the crash, though the F16 had had several design problems, and the inference of defect
was the only means of proof available to her. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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state where plaintiffs had no hope of proving negligent manufacture,
where privity was a bar, and where defendants had no incentive to
make safer products because they could not get caught.
135
An additional important case on this point is Bailey v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.,136 in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
disregarded four of its prior decisions, 3 7 all of which had concluded
that manufacturing defects were not included within the Boyle govern-
ment contractor defense, to determine that manufacturing defects
could be included within Boyle if the defect was one which arose out of
the government's specifications. 138 When might a manufacturing defect
not arise out of the government's specifications? In military equipment
especially, the specifications constitute volumes of documents dealing
with every conceivable feature. Given the court's willingness to include
manufacturing defects if the feature which is defective is the subject of
a specification, nothing would be excluded. In Bailey, for example, the
manufacturing defect was a metallurgic defect in a component part.
139
If the government requires a product feature be made of a particular
metal, the product manufacturer who uses that metal, even if pur-
chased from an unreliable source or from stock known to have had
metallurgic defects, would not be liable because the metal was speci-
fied by the government. Does such a result implicate the discretionary
decisionmaking of the government?' 40 Hardly, because no discretion
135. For an account of products liability law prior to 1960, see Gary T. Schwartz,
New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 796, 797-
811 (1983) (surveying the development history of products liability law).
136. 989 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1993).
137. Id. at 800-01. The prior cases are: Skyline Air Serv., Inc. v. G.L. Capps Co.,
916 F.2d 977, 980 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting manufacturing defects "arguably" not covered
by Boyle); Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1990)
("Boyle reinforced the established reasoning that the government contractor defense only
applies in cases of defective design, not in cases of defective manufacture."); Trevino v.
General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1481 n.6 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding manufacturer
liable for manufacturing defects "no matter who designed or approved the specifica-
tions"); McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 774, 777 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
"military contractor immunity does not apply in cases of defective manufacture").
138. 989 F.2d at 801.
139. Id. at 796. The court stated that "it is possible to have an allegedly defective
feature about which the government specifications are silent." Id. at 799. The court also
explained that if the metal that the product in this case was made of had not been speci-
fied, such a manufacturing defect would not be included. Id. This category of defects to
which the government contractor defense does not apply is small consolation given that
the defense itself is being read so broadly to include manufacturing defects in the first
place. It is unlikely that courts will be quick to exclude many manufacturing defects if
only a hint of a specification relates to the part in question.
140. While the answer begs the question, one case dealing with a manufacturing
defect in sensitive and sophisticated combat weaponry concluded that the government
contractor defense should be extended to such manufacturing defects under a "high-tech
preemption" because of the purely combat use in wartime activities of such products.
Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1489 (C.D. Cal. 1993). In Bentzlin,
the court granted summary judgment to the manufacturer of the Maverick missile which
mistakenly killed Marines during the Persian Gulf War. Id. at 1494. Plaintiffs claimed
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was exercised with regard to the dangerous characteristic of the prod-
uct. Such a result, rather, encourages irresponsibility by the manufac-
turer who has no incentive to avoid the unreasonably dangerous aspect
of the product because of the safety net the defense provides. Such an
extension of the defense-conferred "right" can be legitimately consid-
ered an "abusive" one.
Because Boyle on its face only applies to design defects, courts
have also had to determine whether the government contractor defense
applies to products whose defect lies not in its design or manufacture,
but rather in the manufacturer's failure to communicate the product's
unreasonable dangers so that users may take precautions against
those dangers when using the product. These failure to warn claims
revolve around the manufacturer's conduct more than they do the ac-
tual condition of the product.' 4 ' Consequently, Boyle's foundation-pro-
tection of government discretion in choosing a product design or fea-
ture-would not seem implicated in failure to warn claims because
consumers, not even the government, do not usually purchase products
because of the content of the accompanying warning or instructional
literature. If, however, the government dictates the type of warning or
instructional literature to accompany products it purchases, reflecting
the exercise of discretion, the Boyle government contractor defense log-
ically may be applicable.142 The problem, after Boyle, is defining the
the missile had a manufacturing defect which "caused the missile to deviate from its in-
tended target." Id. at 1487. The court, after noting the disagreement in post-Boyle courts
of its application to manufacturing defects, concluded that the defense "necessarily ex-
tends to preclude manufacturing defect claims. . . against the manufacturers of sophis-
ticated high-technology military equipment (high-tech preemption')." Id. at 1489. The
court, relying on the discretionary function rationale of Boyle, explained that the design
of such single-use wartime products necessarily involves government decisions needing
protection from disclosure to ensure national security. Id. at 1490-92. The court's exemp-
tion for manufacturing defects was thus specifically limited to non-civilian combat prod-
ucts. Id. at 1491. The injury, occurring during wartime, also gave rise to federal inter-
ests in controlling military policy during war. Id. at 1492. See also Koohi v. United
States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 960 (1993) (finding
manufacturer of Aegis Air Defense System not liable for injuries suffered when U.S.S.
Vincennes shot down an Iranian passenger aircraft by mistake during Persian Gulf
"tanker war" with Iran based on "combatant activities" exception to FTCA).
Interestingly, the court goes on to propose that if the government were to assert an
interest in a case involving a manufacturing defect in a non-combat military product,
that assertion alone would be enough to require the case between the plaintiff and the
government contractor to be dismissed. Bentzlin, 833 F. Supp. at 1491 n.8. In Bentzlin,
the United States government intervened and raised state secrets and nonjusticiable po-
litical question arguments seeking dismissal of plaintiffs' case. Id. at 1487. The court
opened up the possibility that all government contractors have to do to have products li-
ability cases dismissed is to encourage the government to intervene and state an inter-
est. Id. at 1489 n.4, 1491 n.8.
141. For a discussion of the nature of failure to warn claims, see James A. Hender-
son, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty
Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265 (1990).
142. In In re Joint Eastern & Southern District New York Asbestos Litigation, 897
F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit explains that the proper scope of the "mili-
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line between applicability and unnecessary expansion.
As with the expansion of Boyle to manufacturing defects, some
courts include failure to warn claims within the scope of Boyle prima-
rily because of Boyle's aim to reduce the potentially unlimited liability
of military contractors, regardless of whether the claims implicate the
interest of protecting discretionary government decisionmaking.'" This
result stems in part from the Supreme Court's focus in Boyle on con-
cern for unlimited manufacturer liability. The Court's sweeping lan-
guage allows lower courts the latitude to apply Boyle, without analy-
sis, to products liability cases simply because it would limit
manufacturer liability.'"
A more thoughtful approach would be to determine if a significant
conflict existed between the state law duty to warn and the federal
contract warning obligations to determine if the interest in protecting
discretionary decisionmaking is present. An excellent example of this
analysis is found in In re Joint Eastern & Southern District New York
Asbestos Litigation.145 In that case, the defendant who supplied the
Navy with asbestos-insulating products provided no warning regarding
the dangers of asbestos exposure, and the contract with the Navy re-
quired none. 46 The court recognized that "the existence of conflicting
federal and state warning requirements can undermine the Govern-
ment's ability to control military procurement" and thus, that Boyle
might apply to failure to warn claims. 47 In spite of this broad reading
tary" contractor defense is determined by whether state law requires a duty on the con-
tractor that the federal contract prohibits, thus creating the significant conflict Boyle re-
quires. Id. at 629-30.
143. For example, in Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135, 136-38 (5th Cir. 1989),
the court held that proof of government approval of design specifications for a weapon
simulator precluded a failure to warn claim even though there was no indication that
the specification included warning requirements. Accord, Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55
F.3d 1150, 1156-57 (6th Cir. 1995). Similarly, in Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
721 F. Supp. 1019, 1025-27 (S.D. Ill. 1989), the court held that Air Force specifications
regarding asbestos-containing parts precluded a failure to warn claim against the manu-
facturer of the parts if the specification said nothing prohibiting warnings. See also
Dorse v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 898 F.2d 1487, 1489-90 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding Boyle
applicable to failure to warn claims); Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 716 F. Supp.
589, 590 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding warning claims can proceed only if conflict between
state tort duty and federal contract duty), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1990).
144. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 637 (2d
Cir. 1990) (Miner, J., concurring). One defendant tried to extend Boyle to a run-of-the-
mill negligent construction case because of the breadth of the opinion. R.B. Hazard, Inc.
v. Panco, 397 S.E.2d 866, 867-68 (Va. 1990) (allowing jury to decide if government con-
tractor defense elements were proved in negligent construction case in spite of its dis-
claimer that Boyle applies to design defect cases only). Another court concluded that
while Boyle was limited to military procurement, it could apply to omissions in testing
the product. In re Aircraft Crash Litig. Frederick, Md., May 6, 1981, 752 F. Supp. 1326,
1337 (S.D. Ohio 1990), aff'd sub nom. Darling v. Boeing Co., 935 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1991).
145. 897 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990).
146. Id. at 627.
147. Id. at 629. This explanation of what Boyle was concerned with--"the Govern-
ment's ability to control military procuremen'-is a reflection of the expansive reading
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of the policy basis of Boyle, the court limited the area of displacement
of state law, tailoring the elements of Boyle to the warning situation.148
If the state law duty conflicts with an actual governmental choice
of the appropriate warning language required, indicating a conscious
balancing of the interests involved in the use of the product, then
Boyle might logically apply and require a determination of the nature
of the specifications, the defendant's compliance with them, and
whether the defendant fully apprised the government of the dangerous
characteristic needing a warning of which the government was not
aware. 149 If not, the interest in discretionary decisionmaking, with
which Boyle says it is most concerned, is not at risk. 150 If courts apply
Boyle to situations where that interest is not at risk, they expand fed-
eral law into an area where it has no business. When that occurs, the
perception of acceptable irresponsibility the Court has created reaches
far beyond the legal holding and affects areas of social policy balancing
at the core of tort law.
b. Extension to non-military contractors. While Boyle involved a
purely military product in a purely military setting, the Court's opin-
ion seemed purposely to leave open the extent to which the defense is
applicable to non-military products in either military or non-military
settings. It seems clear that one of the driving forces behind Boyle was
the Court's concern that the judiciary not second-guess military deci-
courts give Boyle. Id.
148. Id at 630. The court concluded that the contractor must show "that whatever
warnings accompanied a product resulted from a determination of a government official,
and thus that the Government itself 'dictated' the content of the warnings meant to ac-
company the product." Id. (citation omitted). The court's choice of this requirement ap-
propriately heightens the defendant's burden in proving entitlement to the defense in
the warning context to reflect the proper scope of Boyle. Id. at 631; see also Nicholson v.
United Techs. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 598, 604 (D. Conn. 1988) (applying government con-
tractor defense in an inadequate instruction case where defendant established govern-
ment's extensive control over both original compilation of repair manual and revisions).
149. For a discussion of elements of the government contractor defense from Boyle,
see supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
150. The court defined the proper scope of the defense:
Stripped to its essentials, the military contractor's defense under Boyle is to
claim, "The Government made me do it." Boyle displaces state law only when
the Government, making a discretionary, safety-related military procurement
decision contrary to the requirements of state law, incorporates this decision
into a military contractor's contractual obligations, thereby limiting the con-
tractor's ability to accommodate safety in a different fashion.
NY Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d at 632; see also In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig.,
971 E2d 831, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding failure to warn claim not subject to defense
in asbestos cases); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding no conflict between failure to warn claim and military requirement); Jack-
son v. Deft, Inc., 273 Cal. Rptr. 214, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding failure to warn
claim available if no conflict between state tort duty and contract); Timberline Air Serv.,
Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 884 P.2d 920, 927 (Wash. 1994) (holding manufac-
turer's compliance with design defects not absolute defense to post-manufacture failure
to warn claims).
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sions which place combat and tactical effectiveness over the safety of
personnel. 15 f While the Court chose to rely on the "discretionary func-
tion exception" to the FTCA as the basis for its decision (and not the
Feres doctrine which would have limited the scope of the defense to
military personnel), it appears the reason for doing so was not so much
that the Court wanted the defense to apply in non-military contexts
but that it wanted the defense to apply to discretionary military deci-
sionmaking in whatever context. The Boyle opinion left many doors
open for the expansion of the government contractor defense to the
non-military contractor-doors that many defendants have tried, some
successfully, to pass through.
An example of the expansion of Boyle to a non-military product in
a military context is Stone v. FWD Corp.15 2 In Stone, a civilian fireman
employee of the United States Navy brought suit against a fire truck
manufacturer for injuries sustained when he slipped on steps of a
Navy fire truck.153 The defendant successfully argued that the govern-
ment contractor defense prevented the plaintiff's suit from proceeding
even though the plaintiff was injured by non-military equipment.
154
The plaintiff alleged that even though the fire truck was manufactured
pursuant to a contract with the Navy and according to Navy specifica-
tions, 55 a fire truck is not the type of product which Boyle was de-
signed to address because it does not implicate a discretionary military
decision to choose a particular design for combat effectiveness or other
military imperative. 156 In fact, the design aspect in issue, a step and
safety rail, has no impact whatsoever on any governmental decision-
making deserving of protection in the sense contemplated by Boyle.
The district court concluded that Boyle was applicable to this prod-
uct and to the civilian plaintiff.157 The reasoning of Boyle would seem
not to reach non-military products; non-military products do not neces-
sitate conscious design choices to prefer hazardous features which al-
low for certain military capabilities over particular safety features that
would not need to be sacrificed if the product were being purchased for
a routine purpose. The court noted that Boyle was unclear on this
point,15  though Boyle did refer to "government" and not just "military"
contractors. 59 Further, Boyle's reliance on the "discretionary function
exception" of the FTCA indicated the Court's desire that the defense be
151. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12.
152. 822 F. Supp. 1211 (D. Md. 1993).
153. Id. at 1212.
154. Id. at 1212-13.
155. Id. at 1211-12. The defendant did actively participate in the design of the fire
truck, however. Id. The Navy did not simply provide the defendant with specifications
that the defendant mindlessly followed. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. For a similar conclusion involving paint manufactured for the Navy which
injured a civilian plaintiff, see Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629, 635 (5th Cir. 1989).
158. Stone, 822 F. Supp. at 1212 n.4.
159. Id.
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broadly applied. 160 Hence, Boyle was read to apply to the very type of
design flaw, lack of an appropriate safety feature, that strict products
liability was intended to prevent.
Even though the product conformed with the Navy's specifica-
tions161 and the defendant offered proof that it was not actually aware
of any design defect, 162 this product is not contained within the scope
or spirit of Boyle because no discretionary decisionmaking needing pro-
tection was present. To include such design "choices" within the de-
fense would allow product manufacturers "protection" from failing to
provide reasonable safety devices which would have no impact on the
product's function or the government agency's decisionmaking in an
area of "unique federal interest" as was present in Boyle.16 s The Court
created a perception in Boyle that permitted, even encouraged, the
court in Stone to extend immunity from responsibility.
The extension in Stone is defensible, if at all, based on Boyle's reli-
ance on the protection needed for military discretion in decisionmak-
ing. The extension to non-military products made by non-military con-
tractors for non-military government agencies is not a legitimate
expansion based on Boyle. Several courts have done so, however.
Carley v. Wheeled Coach' from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals is
the primary example.'0
In Carley, the plaintiff, an emergency medical technician, was in-
jured while riding in an ambulance made by the defendant for the
General Services Administration (GSA).166 She alleged that the ambu-
lance was defectively designed because it was prone to turn over due
to an excessively high center of gravity.167 The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment based on Boyle's govern-
ment contractor defense. 6 8 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
160. Id. The court also relied on a number of other cases which had concluded that
Boyle applied to non-military products. See, eg., Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
890 F.2d 698, 700 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding Boyle particularly applicable in the military
equipment context), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953 (1990); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d
591, 598 (7th Ci. 1985) (finding front end loader being used on a military base consti-
tuted military equipment); cf Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212, 216-17
(W.D. Wis. 1992) (holding defense applicable to the non-military context where the
United States Postal Service procured mail delivery vehicles).
161. Stone, 822 F. Supp. at 1212.
162. Id. The third prong of Boyle requires that the government contractor had no
actual knowledge of a design defect that it did not warn the government about. Boyle,
487 U.S. at 512. This is decidedly more pro-manufacturer, and less rigorous, than the
usual "knew or should have known" standard that tort law generally imposes on
defendants.
163. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500.
164. 991 F2d 1117 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 868 (1993).
165. Id. at 1117.
166. Id. at 1118.
167. Id. Plaintiff was employed by the Virgin Islands Department of Health at St.
Croix Hospital. Id. Plaintiff suffered knee and back injuries in the accident. Id.
168. Id.
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court's application of the government contractor defense under federal
common law.169
The court of appeals noted the split in authority on whether the
Boyle government contractor defense is available to manufacturers of
non-military products. 170 After identifying the twin areas which made
the product design in Boyle an issue of uniquely federal concern-up-
holding government contracts and protecting the exercise of govern-
ment discretion-the court acknowledged that the driving force behind
Boyle was the financial effect of excess liability on the government
through its contractors. 17 This interest, based on the FTCA and not
169. Id. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment,
however, because the defendant failed to prove the third prong of the Boyle test: that
the defendant warned the United States of dangers in the product known to the defend-
ant but not to the government. Id
170. Id. at 1119. Those courts holding the government contractor defense available
to non-military product manufacturers include: Glassco v. Miller Equip. Co., 966 F.2d
641, 642 (11th Cir 1992) (holding defense available to manufacturer of leather lineman's
belt originally made for Army); Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir.
1986) (protecting manufacturer of swine flu vaccine, based on Illinois law pre-Boyle);
Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding manufacturer
of brucellosis vaccine protected by government contractor defense based on Alabama law
pre-Boyle); Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212, 217 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (holding
government contractor defense applies for postal service contracts for special vehicles);
Jackson v. Deft, Inc., 273 Cal. Rptr. 214, 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding defense avail-
able on warning claim against paint manufacturer).
Courts holding the government contractor defense inapplicable to non-military prod-
ucts include: In re Hawaii Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding as-
bestos used in Navy products a commercial product-not Navy-specific-and thus not
military equipment); Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1455
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding paint manufacturer who sold paint to Army Corps of Engineers
was not entitled to defense where paint was designed for civilian purposes); In re Air-
craft Crash Litig. Frederick, Md., May 6, 1981, 752 F. Supp. 1326, 1335 (S.D. Ohio 1990)
(limiting defense to military product procurement), aff'd sub nom., Darling v. Boeing Co.,
935 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1991); Pietz v. Orthopedic Equip. Co., 562 So. 2d 152, 154 (Ala.
1989) (finding issue of fact whether snap links used in mountain climbing are military
equipment), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823 (1990); Reynolds v. Penn Metal Fabricators, 550
N.Y.S.2d 811, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding postal cart manufacturer not entitled to
defense); In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 542 N.Y.S.2d 118, 119 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)
(finding asbestos not military equipment); Jackson v. Alert Fire & Safety Equip., Inc.,
567 N.E.2d 1027, 1033 (Ohio 1991) (holding protective fire fighting equipment not mili-
tary product and defense inapplicable).
A number of courts have been asked to apply the defense to non-military products
but decided the cases before them without reaching the issue of whether Boyle applied.
See, eg., Dillaplain v. Lite Indus., 788 S.W.2d 530, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (relying on
government contractor defense where fireman sued for asbestos exposure from protective
clothing, but case involved personal jurisdiction); Trapnell v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 850
S.W.2d 529, 549 (Tex. App. 1992) (holding where defendant raised defense based on sup-
plying food services to Navy cafeteria and plaintiff died of sulfite poisoning from food,
defense unavailable because defendant failed to prove elements of defense), affrd, 890
S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1994).
171. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1120 ("[W]ithout the government contractor defense, it
would be more difficult and costly for the government to acquire products. The govern-
ment would suffer this economic harm regardless of whether it procured a product for
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the Feres doctrine, is present in every procurement contract, not just
military contracts. 172
The Carley court recognized that the important assumption justi-
fying Boyle, that the selection of military product designs involved "not
merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many
technical, military and even social considerations, including specifically
the trade-off between greater safety and combat effectiveness," 173 was
not present in the selection of non-military designs. 74 Nonetheless, the
court in Carley found that increased contractor liability and the effect
on government decisionmaking were sufficient, standing alone, to war-
rant extending the defense to non-military products. 175
It was, then, easy for the court to conclude that the decision to
choose a particular design for a non-military product implicated a sig-
nificant conflict between state and federal law to extend the defense to
those product manufacturers. 76 It is particularly interesting to note
that the design feature in issue, the center of gravity of the ambu-
lance, was not specified in the GSA's design specifications. Instead,
this detail was left up to the manufacturer, so long as the parameters
of the chassis manufacturer, in this case Ford Motor Company, were
met.' 77 The defendant exclusively chose the location of the center of
gravity and should have been responsible for its unreasonably danger-
ous choice, not the GSA. How in such a case is the exercise of a gov-
ernmental discretionary function implicated? 178
military or civilian use.'). The court noted, also, that the government contractor defense
of Boyle was based, not on the Feres doctrine, as had the courts of appeals opinions on
the subject, but on the "discretionary function exception" of the FTCA. This foundational
difference was "the strongest reason" for making the defense available to non-military
product manufacturers. Id. at 1120-21.
172. Id. at 1121-22.
173. Boyle, 487 US. at 511-12.
174. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1121-22.
175. Id. at 1122. The court attempted to distinguish Boyle and its reliance on com-
bat effectiveness decisions in a lengthy footnote. See id. at 1122 n.3. The court seemed
uneasy with its decision and dissected Boyle to conclude that the interest in noninterfer-
ence with military decisions was "on an equal footing with. . . the other policy concerns
mentioned, such as engineering analysis, technical, military and social considerations,
and passed-on costs of judgments against contractors." Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 1122. The court states that its holding is consistent with a Seventh Cir-
cuit and an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision. Id. at 1123. Both those decisions
were based on state law prior to Boyle. For a discussion of state law prior to Boyle, see
supra note 170 and accompanying text.
177. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1125. The court of appeals ultimately reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment because it found the defendant had not proved the
third element of the Boyle defense, that it warned the government of known dangers of
which the government was unaware. Id. at 1127. The district court took judicial notice of
the fact that the government conducts its own crashworthiness tests and of the well-
known propensity of vehicles with high centers of gravity to crash. Id. at 1126. The
court of appeals did not agree that either of these matters are properly the subject of ju-
dicial notice. Id.
178. The court disagreed with the contrary decisions reached by two panels of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 1124 (referring to In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos
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Once the interest being protected is reduced to its lowest common
denominator, every transaction in which the government is even tan-
gentially involved will become one to which the immunity defined in
Boyle could attach. As Judge Becker states in his dissent: "[Tihe cost
theory relied on by the majority proves too much, for every time the
government purchases a product made in the private sector, potential
liability costs (factored into the price) are passed on to the govern-
ment."179 The perception of tolerable irresponsibility, for the sake of
supposedly imperiled government fisc, is a bandwagon on which all
government contractors, state and federal, will jump.8 0 It becomes in-
creasingly clear, after decisions like Carley, that the Court's opinion in
Boyle was truly a Pandora's box for victims of defective products and a
boon to product manufacturers seeking refuge from their responsibility
to make safe products.
c. Extension through application of the Boyle test. Boyle defines
three elements which a government contractor must prove to be enti-
tled to its immunity.'8 ' The first requirement is that the government
approved "reasonably precise specifications," indicating the exercise of
Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 810-12 (9th Cir. 1992) and Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint
Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1452-55 (9th Cir. 1990)). The court felt that Judge Becker's dissent
gave undue importance to Boyle's "premise[ ] on concerns unique to the military." Id. at
1122 n.3; cf id. at 1129 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing
with the policy justifications for protecting military contractors from tort liability). Judge
Becker, while recognizing a federal interest in limiting liability arising from its procure-
ment contracts, concludes that such an interest is not in "significant conflict" with state
law to warrant the extension of federal common law immunity to it. Id. at 1131 (Becker,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is particularly so, according to Judge
Becker, because of the historically narrow areas in which federal common law, and par-
ticularly an immunity, operates. Id. at 1132-33.
179. Id. at 1132 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For an ad-
ditional criticism of Carley, see Jake Thomas Townsend, Comment, Ambulance Chasers
Beware: Carley v. Wheeled Coach and the Questionable Expansion of the Government
Contractor Defense, 78 MINN. L. RFV. 1545 (1994).
180. In fact, a Pennsylvania federal district court judge recently extended Carley to
protect non-military contractors under state law in Davis v. Budd Co., No. ClV.A.94-
3023, 1995 WL 766015 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 26, 1995), a case based on diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. Plaintiff sued to recover for injuries sustained from the collapse of a motor-
man seat on which he was sitting as driver for a Southeastern Pennsylvania Transport
Authority (SEPTA) railcar. Id. at *1. Plaintiff claimed the mechanical latching device on
the folding seat was defective and sued the manufacturer of the railcar who had pur-
chased the seat from another supplier and installed it on the railcar. Id. Under the
plaintiff's strict liability claim, the manufacturer would be liable for the defective prod-
uct regardless of whether it had manufactured it or not. The prior Pennsylvania cases
had not addressed the immunity in strict products liability actions and are, in fact, quite
liberal in most of their strict products liability doctrine. See, eg., Azzarello v. Black Bros.
Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (Pa. 1978) (holding supplier is guarantor of products' safety). In
spite of significant policy differences in strict products liability cases, the trial court ex-
tended the defense, relying on federal court cases interpreting the federal government
contractor defense, including Carley, extended the defense. Davis, 1995 WL 766015, at
*2 n.3.
181. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
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the discretionary judgment Boyle sought to protect.18 2 Because the
Court did not define what "reasonably precise specifications" are, this
element has been the subject of much discussion from courts applying
Boyle. One would think that the specifications which form the basis of
the defense must indicate that the government did exercise its discre-
tion in choosing the design feature in question, not that it was ap-
proved through some "pro forma" approval process where the review is
superficial or nonexistent. A number of cases have agreed with this
conclusion, indicating that a mere "rubber stamp" of the manufac-
turer's specifications is not sufficient approval. 183 The difficulty lies in
determining what constitutes approval of precise specifications and not
mere rubber stamping. It is here that many courts have applied the
defense based on little government involvement in the design of the
product feature at issue, expanding Boyle to areas where the interest
in protecting discretionary functions is not threatened.
For example, in Stout v. Borg-Warner Corp.,8 4 the plaintiff, an
Army air-conditioning repair technician, lost several fingers on his
hand while attempting to repair an air-conditioning unit for the Hawk
Missile Mobile System Repair Unit.185 The plaintiff had removed the
side panels from the unit while it was in operation and was manually
trying to determine the cause of the problem when his hand was
caught in the fan blades.8 8 The plaintiff alleged that the unit should
have had side panels which could not be removed while the unit was
operating or some similar protective device to prevent contact with the
fan blades. 187 The unit was designed by the defendant based on a prod-
uct originally designed by the Army.88 At no time during the design
182. Id.
183. See Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft Corp., 912 F.2d 67, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing "rubber stamp" approval insufficient, but no rubber stamp where proposed design
change suggested by defendant was subjected to several levels of approval); Trevino v.
General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1486 (5th Cir.) (requiring "approval based on
substantive review and evaluation," not mere rubber stamp, where Navy left design of
submarine diving chamber in issue entirely to defendant), cert. denied, 493 US. 935
(1989).
184. 933 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 502 US. 981 (1991).
185. Id. at 332. The unit "serves to maintain controlled atmospheric conditions in-
side the shelter to the repair unit, preventing damage to the sensitive computers and ra-
dar systems essential to the performance to the Hawk Missile System." Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
The Army Corps of Engineers had developed the predecessor to the. . . air
conditioner, known as the VEA4-3. In the early 1960s, the Army Corps of En-
gineers. . . wrote and issued initial specifications for a redesigned VEA4-3
air conditioner for specific use with the Hawk Missile System. The Army's in-
itial specifications included engineering design drawings and required shop
drawings and pre-production models. The Army's specifications for the unit's
condenser fan... did not provide for, or prohibit, the installation of a safety
device, such as a wire screen to cover the condenser fan.
In 1966, [Fairchild Industries] was awarded the contract to redesign the
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review process did it appear that the Army, who critiqued and ulti-
mately approved the designs submitted, prevented the inclusion of the
suggested safety features. 8 9 Rather, it appears that the issue simply
did not come up, not that the Army affirmatively chose the design
without safety features in some balance of safety and economic or com-
bat effectiveness factors. 190 Plaintiff argued that the Army "only ac-
cepted, but did not approve within the meaning of Boyle, the product's
design features. " 19' Consequently, the defendant could have complied
with the Army's specifications and its state tort law duty and, there-
fore, there was no significant conflict governed by Boyle.
192
The court of appeals upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant. 193 While there was an Army review of the
design generally, and even specifically as to some elements, there was
no discussion or evaluation of the proposed safety features during that
review process. Boyle requires that, to protect military discretionary
decisionmaking, the government must have chosen the particular fea-
ture which is challenged, not simply have accepted it by default or
without consideration.1 4 The court in Stout appears correct in its con-
clusion that there was more involvement than mere rubber stamping
of the defendant's design. 95 However, to be true to the purpose of
Boyle and not overextend its application to situations in which the im-
munity need not operate, the court should have determined whether
the particular feature in question came under such scrutiny that a dis-
cretionary decision was made with regard to that feature, not with re-
gard to the product's general design as a whole.196 Only then will the
purpose of Boyle be promoted and liability be imposed where appropri-
VEA4-3. Fairchild performed a detailed engineering analysis, including engi-
neering calculations to select components for the VEA4-3A that would comply
with the Army's specifications.
Id. at 332-33. This analysis did not include any safety features of the type which would
ostensibly have prevented plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 333.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 334.
192. Id. at 334-35.
193. Id. at 336.
194. For a discussion of Boyle's affirmative government choice requirement, see
supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
195. Stout, 933 F.2d at 336.
196. Id. This was the result of Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989), which the Stout court distinguished as in-
volving a true rubber stamp situation. Stout, 933 F.2d at 335. In Trevino, the contractor
seemed to have more control over the product's design, and the government apparently
abdicated control over it. Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1486. However, the Trevino court specifi-
cally called for an analysis of the government's actions with regard to the particular de-
sign feature in question and actual government discretion over that feature. Id. This
analysis was lacking in Stout. Further, Trevino concluded that rubber stamping could oc-
cur even if the government retained the right to reject the design at any stage of the
process, implying that courts should give detailed scrutiny to the actual process, not just
the paper process. Id.
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ate. Stout allows for the unnecessary expansion of the perception of ir-
responsibility created by Boyle because the decision discourages manu-
facturers from considering user safety along with the government's
design requirements. In Stout, there was no need to choose product de-
sign over safety; both could be accommodated.
Certainly there are areas where the immunity created by Boyle,
though leading to a harsh result for injured armed services personnel,
"is a necessary consequence of the incompatibility of modern products
liability law and the exigencies of national defense."19 7 Where continu-
ous back and forth discussions between government personnel and
contractors evidence a conscious government decision to choose a prod-
uct feature while aware of the risks involved, the contractor is not in a
position to disagree, absent refusing to perform. 9 3 Allowing immunity
when the government contractor has no meaningful alternative in the
specific design feature challenged ensures that discretionary choices
are protected without unwarranted intrusion into the sphere of respon-
sibility. However, allowing immunity for all design features, regardless
of the quality of the discretion exercised in the selection, is an invita-
tion to irresponsibility for product manufacturers. 99
The second prong of the Boyle test is whether the product con-
forms to design specifications. 200 This element is a purely factual one,
not subject to interpretation.20 ' The last element requires that the
defendant warn the government of the dangers from equipment use
that were actually known to the supplier but not to the government.
20 2
The Boyle court specifically identified that it was "actual" and not con-
197. Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030 (1990); see also Landgraf v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter
Co., 993 F.2d 558, 564 (6th Cir.) (finding Army made discretionary decision not to insist
on compliance with general specifications), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 993 (1993).
198. See, eg., Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft Corp., 912 F.2d 67, 71-72 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding Army required defendant to use the ball bearing which plaintiff alleged was de-
fectively designed); Kleeman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698, 700-01 (4th Cir.
1989) (finding design of F/A-18 aircraft resulted from intensive Navy involvement, in-
cluding Navy personnel on staff with the defendant during design and engineering), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 953 (1990).
199. See also Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1993) (ex-
tending defense to "non-critical" design feature which did not represent conflict between
federal contract and state tort law where government did not exercise discretion regard-
ing choice of that feature over safety risk in design of F-111-F aircraft), cert. denied, 509
US. 924 (1993); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 911 F. Supp. 1161, 1175 (E.D. Wis.) (ap-
plying government contractor defense despite contractual language giving it "total design
responsibility" for a military supply truck occupying a "middle ground" for Boyle's first
prong), aff'd, 96 F3d 992 (7th Cir. 1996); Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 721 F.
Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (allowing defense for use of asbestos in design even
though asbestos not specified in design drawings).
200. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 US. 500, 512 (1988).
201. See Kleeman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989) (decid-
ing whether conformity required with general as opposed to detailed specifications), cert.
denied, 495 US. 953 (1990).
202. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
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structive knowledge that was relevant. By providing immunity for dan-
gers actually known and warned of, Boyle discourages product manu-
facturers from investigating the dangers of its products.
20 3
What manufacturer will diligently search for and evaluate the
dangerousness of its product designs if to do so would only lead to an
obligation to warn the government and potential liability? A manufac-
turer is able, under Boyle, to claim ignorance of what he "should have
known" as an expert in the field.2 °4 The history of the reasonable per-
son as the standard for negligent conduct has always required an ob-
jective, not a subjective standard of knowledge.2 5 In strict products lia-
bility actions, knowledge of the dangers inherent in a product are
imputed to the manufacturer so that the plaintiff need not prove what
should have been known, with the attendant expert testimony and de-
lay, as the manufacturer is presumed to know the dangerous charac-
teristics of his products.20 6 Yet in Boyle the Supreme Court chooses to
hold certain product manufacturers responsible only for dangers in
their products that are actually known. Such a choice illustrates how
the Court encourages irresponsible conduct.
2. Expansion of Boyle to non-tort situations
The breadth of the holding in Boyle affects non-tort cases and situ-
ations. The Court's conclusion in Boyle that federal law preempts state
law based on a tenuous conflict encourages defendants to seek shelter
behind expansive readings of favorable federal law over traditionally
applicable state common law. As mentioned above, a number of courts
have expanded Boyle to apply to non-military products and acci-
dents. 27 In addition, defendants have tried to stretch Boyle's preemp-
203. For an example of the application of this prong, see Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 741
F. Supp 1472, 1492 (D. Kan. 1990) (allowing defense if defendant could prove no actual
knowledge of dangers of exposure to benzene), aff'd and remanded, 948 F.2d 1546 (10th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992).
204. Product manufacturers are generally held to the standard of knowledge of an
expert in the field. See generally NV. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAw OF TORTS § 96 (5th ed. 1984).
205. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
He may, furthermore, be engaged in an activity, or stand in a relation to
others, which imposes upon him an obligation to investigate and find out, so
that the person becomes liable not so much for being ignorant as for remain-
ing ignorant; and this obligation may require a person to know at least
enough to conduct an intelligent inquiry as to what he does not know. The
... manufacturer of goods to be sold to the public,. . . [is] charged with the
duty of the affirmative action which would be taken by a reasonable person
in their position to discover dangers of which they may not be informed.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 204, § 32 (footnotes omitted).
206. See generally Davis, supra note 32, at 1241-44; John W. Wade, On the Effect
in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734
(1983).
207. For a discussion of cases extending Boyle to non-military products and acci-
dents, see supra notes 151-76 and accompanying text.
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tion analysis to obtain favorable federal law in a number of other
circumstances.
For example, defendants often seek to remove cases to federal
court for the seeming advantages: different (better?) jury pools, differ-
ent (better?) judges, quicker dockets, and smoother procedures, among
others. Without complete diversity or federal question jurisdiction,
which are rarely present in normal tort and products liability cases,
removal is not an option. Boyle may give defendants an option. Be-
cause Boyle's ratio decidendi for creating a federal common law de-
fense for government contractors is sovereign immunity based on the
"discretionary function exception" to the FTCA, Boyle arguably extends
a quasi-immunity to government contractors. This quasi-immunity
could support a colorable claim to a federal law defense, thus support-
ing removal under § 1442(a)(1) of the removal statute.23 In one of the
many Agent Orange cases under his control, Judge Weinstein dis-
cussed the effect of Boyle on the removal of those cases. 20 9 Judge
Weinstein noted that Boyle may provide a colorable claim to federal
law governance, not because it provides a defense, but because, after
Boyle, federal law defines the standard of care, albeit a very low one,
to which covered contractors must comply.
210
The Court in Boyle took great pains to say that it was not ex-
tending official immunity to government contractors, 211 but the natural
208. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1994). Section 1442(a)(1) allows removal of actions
against "C[any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting under
him, for any act under color of such office" Id.; see also Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121,
139 (1989) (requiring federal defense for removal under § 1442(a)). For an application of
§ 1442(a)(1) removal based on the government contractor defense, see Akin v. Big Three
Indus., Inc., 851 F. Supp. 819, 823 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Viala v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., No. C94-0399EFL, 1994 WL 139287, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 1994).
209. Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Judge Weinstein
had also written one of the first and most influential opinions on the government con-
tractor defense prior to Boyle. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046,
1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 194
(2d Cir. 1987) (afffiming summary judgment against opt-out plaintiffs on basis of gov-
ernment contractor defense).
210. Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 944-45. Judge Weinstein refused to rule on the motion
to amend the defendant's removal notice to allege this basis of removal and certified the
matter of removal immediately to the Second Circuit. Id. at 935. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit refused to decide the applicability of § 1442(a)(1) removal to the
defendants and concluded that removal was proper under the All Writs Act to issue
writs "necessary or appropriate" in aid of its jurisdiction. In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1431-32 (2d Cir. 1993). For additional discussion of Boyle as
support for removal based on federal question jurisdiction based on federal common law,
see Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding Boyle
governs determination of whether federal common law exists to govern insurance cover-
age provided under a private health insurance policy for federal employees and supports
federal common law when "mere possibility" of conflict exists between federal interest
and state law).
211. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 505 n.1 (1988) (declining to ad-
dress whether Court was extending sovereign immunity to non-government employees
as Justice Brennan suggests in dissent).
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effect of its holding was to provide at least a taste of such immunity.
When defendants get a taste of immunity, there is no natural stopping
point where defendants will say, "I'm not entitled to immunity for
that." The parameters of the immunity will be stretched to cover as
much territory as possible. That is one of the real effects of Boyle and
why the resulting irresponsibility is so significant. The abuse of the
"right" of immunity is evidenced by the lengths to which the benefi-
ciaries of the Court's largesse will go to take advantage of it. For ex-
ample, manufacturers of Agent Orange who have benefited from the
immunity afforded them by the government contractor defense212 re-
cently tried to obtain indemnity from the government for amounts they
contributed to settlement, their attorneys' fees, and litigation costs as-
sociated with litigating Agent Orange claims. 213 The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit concluded that because the defendants had ac-
cess to the government contractor defense, no liability would attach
and therefore no indemnity was available.214 The government could not
prevent the filing of claims against the defendants and the immunity
extended to the defendants through Boyle did not include costs in-
curred to defend claims or settlement costs. On appeal, the Supreme
Court virtually ignored Boyle in deciding the case and rejected the
manufacturers' claims, relying on the contractual relationship between
the government and the manufacturers and finding no express or im-
plied promise to indemnify.
215
In addition, the extension of federal preemption to areas where
the federal interest is remote and speculative at best signals a major
expansion of the traditionally limited areas where federal common law
governs. Justice Brennan's dissent heralds such an expansion 216 and
warns of the danger of expanding historically narrow federal interests
and displacing state law.217 For example, in Lamb v. Martin Marietta
Energy Systems, Ina,218 the court read Boyle broadly to provide immu-
nity to an operator of a gaseous diffusion plant to prevent recovery for
contamination of the environment.219 This was so even though the fed-
212. For a discussion of the applicability of the government contractor defense to
Agent Orange Manufacturers, see supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
213. Hercules Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 616 (1992), affrd, 24 F.3d 188 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996). The contractors proceeded on several contract
and warranty-based claims which assumed that the federal government somehow made
it more difficult for the contractor to perform the contract, therefore causing it to incur
unexpected costs. Hercules, 24 F.3d at 192.
214. Id. at 194.
215. Hercules Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981, 985 (1996).
216. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 518-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("And the Coures ability to
list 2, or 10, inapplicable areas of 'uniquely federal interest' does not support its conclu-
sion that the liability of Government contractors is so 'clear and substantial' an interest
that this Court must step in lest state law does 'major damage.' ").
217. For an example of such extension in the face of an exzpress preemption provi-
sion, see Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74, 79 (4th Cir. 1993).
218. 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
219. Id. at 966.
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eral statute which conferred a cause of action for the plaintiff specifi-
cally stated that the rule for decision would be the law of the state
where the incident occurred. 2 0 Needless to say, if Congress has seen
fit to provide a cause of action based on state law, then there should
be no federal common law preempting that liability. Even Boyle recog-
nized a federal common law defense only because of significant conflict
with federal policies reflected by rules operating in other areas. There
was no statutory scheme which operated in Boyle.221 While the court in
Lamb concluded that the defendant had failed to satisfy Boyle's ele-
ments,2 2 its potential extension of Boyle to the negligent performance
of a service contract illustrates the encouragement the Court has given
to defendants to claim the "right" of immunity. An institutional defend-
ant will naturally seek to come within the protection of sanctioned ex-
cuses for its behavior, not acknowledge its irresponsible behavior.
C. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. and Express Federal Preemption of
State Standards of Responsibility
The Court again had an opportunity to elaborate on the way in
which federal legislation and policies preempt common law standards
of responsibility in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.2 r Cipollone raised
issues of responsibility by requiring the Court to define the effect on
state common law actions of the provisions of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (the 1965 Act)224 and Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (the 1969 Act)225 which mandate
the cigarette warning label. The Court took this opportunity to resolve
tensions between state and federal court decisions regarding the appli-
cation of federal preemption doctrine under these statutes. 25 At the
same time, however, the Cipollone decision reflects the Court's contin-
uing effort to curtail broad rules of institutional responsibility in favor
of limited ones. This is particularly evident in Cipollone which in-
volved the peculiarly state law dominated field of products liability in
contrast to the traditionally federally governed areas of admiralty and
national defense involved in East River Steamship and Boyle. The
220. Id. at 962 (referring to Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2014(hh), 2210(n)(2) (1994)).
221. For a discussion of Boyle's lack of a statutory scheme, see supra notes 86-87
and accompanying text. This is one of the reasons that Justice Brennan in dissent
strongly disagreed that federal common law should operate-because Congress had spe-
cifically chosen not to recognize a defense by statute. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 518 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
222. Lamb, 835 F. Supp. at 966-68.
223. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
224. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1340 (1994).
225. Id. §§ 1331-1340.
226. Cipollone, 505 US. at 508. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for ex-
ample, concluded that the plaintiff's claims were preempted by the 1969 Act based on an
implied preemption analysis. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.
1990); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Ci. 1986).
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Cipollone case was of such a high profile, being the first tobacco litiga-
tion to reach a trial and verdict for the plaintiff, that the Court's opin-
ion was expected by all observers to have significance beyond the spe-
cific preemption analysis the Court announced.
227
Many scholars have analyzed the Court's preemption decision and
explored its effect on the scope of federal government involvement in
tort actions. 28 It is axiomatic that when Congress speaks, its voice is
supreme.229 Similarly, when the Court speaks about an issue that fed-
eral law governs under the Supremacy Clause, courts take notice, even
though the particulars of the decision itself may not specifically re-
quire such deference. The Court's voice under the Supremacy Clause is
especially forceful because it prevents the states from exercising their
historic "police powers," such as defining the nature of common law
tort responsibilities.
230
In Cipollone, the Court gave controlling authority to an express
federal preemption provision "when that provision provides a 'reliable
indicium of congressional intent.' "21 The Court appeared to be trying
to preserve the traditional state police power role in such areas as de-
fining civil duties and liabilities by protecting that role absent Con-
gress's clear intent to usurp it. The Court consequently reiterated its
dedication to the presumption against preemption and concluded that
227. For a discussion of the history of tobacco litigation, see Richard L. Rabin, A
Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992).
228. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability
Doctrines, 44 S.C. L. REv. 187 (1993) (describing one-dimensional approach to preemption
analysis post-Cipollone and advocating an interpretive approach); Richard C. Ausness,
The Impact of the Cipollone Case on Federal Preemption Law, 15 J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB.
1 (1993) (discussing effect of Cipollone on other products liability claims); Peter L. Kahn,
Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort Reform, 72 N.C. L.
REv. 1129 (1994) (concluding expansion of preemption defense through Cipollone inap-
propriately reduces role of tort law and encourages less responsibility for product safety).
229. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. The Cipollone Court explained: "[S]ince our decision
in McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal
law is 'without effect." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citations omitted).
230. "Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 US. 218, 230 (1947)). "Ac-
cordingly, '[tihe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of pre-emption analysis."
Id. (citations omitted).
231. Id. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 453 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)). In
addition, the Court has recognized areas in which a federal statutory scheme may im-
plicitly preempt state regulation of the area even when no express preemption provision
exists. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (holding state law preempted if it actually conflicts with federal
law); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding federal law may
thoroughly occupy a legislative field leaving "no room for the States to supplement W).
Interestingly, there is no discussion of Boyle regarding preemption. Boyle was one of the
Court's most recent preemption decisions and appears to have involved the "actual con-
flict with federal law" category of implied preemption.
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the clear and manifest intent of Congress must be shown to preempt
traditional state police power regulations.
232
On its face, then, it would appear that the Court's preemption
analysis would restrict the availability of preemption as a defense be-
cause the Court requires an express provision, if one exists, in any
preemption determination, forbidding the lower courts to use implied
preemption as a basis for the defense in such cases.233 More often than
not, regulatory statutes do not expressly preempt common law damage
awards.2 4 Since Cipollone requires an interpretation of the clear mean-
232. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
233. Lower courts have consistently and legitimately read Cipollone this way. In
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), the Court may have reopened the
door to implied preemption even if an express provision exists. Myrick involved the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which has an express preemption
provision operating only if there is a specific motor vehicle safety regulation in place by
the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration. Id. at 1486. In Myrick,
the plaintiff was injured in a accident involving a tractor trailer without anti-lock brakes
(ABS) and sued based on the lack of ABS as a design defect. Id. at 1485. The Court af-
firmed a finding by the Eleventh Circuit of no express preemption. Id. The Court also
somewhat gratuitously said:
The fact that an express definition of the preemptive reach of a statute "im-
plies-i.e., supports a reasonable inference-that Congress did not intend to
pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express clause entirely fore-
closes any possibility of implied pre-emption. . . . At best, Cipollone supports
an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-
emption; it does not establish a rule.
Id. at 1488.
This observation will inevitably lead to increased argument for implied preemption
even when express preemption has failed. In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240
(1996), discussed infra at notes 286-306 and accompanying text, the Court, in deciding a
preemption case involving the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act (MDA), relied on an express preemption provision and stated:
As in [Cipollone], we are presented with the task of interpreting a statutory
provision that expressly pre-empts state law. While the preemptive language
of § 360k(a) means that we need not go beyond that language to determine
whether Congress intended the MDA to pre-empt at least some state law ...
we must nonetheless "identify the domain expressly pre-empted" by that
language.
Id. at 2250. The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Stevens who wrote the Cipollone
plurality, concluded by suggesting that implied conflict preemption analysis might re-
solve certain additional claims not resolved by the express preemption provision. Id. at
2259. The Court did not have to address this issue, however, because it concluded none
of the plaintiffs' claims were expressly preempted. For a discussion of the preemptive
reach of the MDA and the Lohr decision, see infra notes 286-309 and accompanying text.
234. For example, federal courts have routinely found that federal law that estab-
lishes safety options for automobiles impliedly preempts common law claims based on
defective design for failing to have an airbag. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1420 (1988) (repealed 1994), and Federal Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Standard (FMVSS), while containing an express preemption provision that
prohibits nonidentical state regulation when a federal safety standard deals with an as-
pect of the vehicle's performance, id. § 1392(d), also has a savings clause that allows
common law damages actions against the manufacturers. Id. § 1392(k). Most courts have
found these provisions do not expressly preempt common law damages claims, but have
found an implied preemption in spite of the savings clause. See Taylor v. General Motors
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ing of the express preemption provision as the only likely means of
finding preemption, defendants relying on federal regulatory schemes
to set standards of responsibility may have been surprised and con-
cerned by the Court's decision, especially after the broad protections
from responsibility afforded by East River Steamship and Boyle.23 5 A
close reading of the Court's preemption analysis in Cipollone clarifies
that such a fear is unfounded. The Court's "clear meaning" interpreta-
tion of an express preemption provision is anything but clear and
broadens rather than limits the availability of express preemption as
an immunity from responsibility.
In applying its analysis to the language of the 1965 Act, the Court
concluded that the presumption against preemption required a narrow
reading of the Act's preemption provision which prevented states from
requiring additional or different "statements" on cigarette packages or
in advertising.2 6 In discussing the relationship between congressional
requirements involving safety and health, like cigarette labeling, and
state law interests in allowing damages actions for its injured citizens,
the Court noted that "there is no general, inherent conflict between
federal pre-emption of state warning requirements and the continued
vitality of state common law damages actions" which provide recovery
for those injured by the inadequacy of the warning.2 7 The Court shows
initial respect for state standards of responsibility by refusing to recog-
nize an ouster of those standards absent Congress's clear desire to do
SO.
Discussing the 1969 Act, however, the Court changes its approach
significantly and appears to move away from an analysis of Congress's
clear and manifest intent to a much more lax analysis in its evaluation
of that intent, relying instead on the inconsistent language of the stat-
ute to discover a preemption scope very likely unintended by the Con-
Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 827 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding a state common law rule that would
effectually frustrate a federal regulatory scheme is impliedly preempted despite savings
clause), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395,
419 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding implicit preemption where Congress forbade agencies from
setting standards nonidentical to federal statutes despite savings clause), cert. denied,
494 US. 1065 (1990).
235. For a discussion of the possible effect of Myrick, see supra note 233 and ac-
companying text.
236. Cipollone, 505 US. at 518. A majority of the Court joined in section III of the
opinion in which Justice Stevens outlined the operative legal principles regarding ex-
press preemption. Id. at 508. In addition, a majority of the justices joined in section IV
of the opinion applying those principles to the 1965 Act, concluding the Act did not pre-
empt state common law damages actions. Id. at 508.
237. Id. at 518. The Court supported this conclusion with a reference to the Com-
prehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 4401 (1986),
which specifically preempted additional state warning requirements and at the same
time explicitly saved common law damages actions. Cipollone, 505 US. at 518. The
Court further looked to the purpose of the Act, which expressed a desire to avoid non-
uniform regulations, and the regulatory history of the Act, which was prompted by the
impending regulation of cigarette package labeling by the Federal Trade Commission. Id.
at 519.
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gress which enacted it. 23 8 The Court reviewed the semantic changes in
the statutory preemption language from the 1965 Act to the 1969
Act 239 and concluded that these seemingly minor changes sweep
broadly, in spite of the fact that neither of the parties suggested that
the changes were significant to the analysis. 240 Further, even though
the Court said preemption of police powers would be found only where
Congress's intent to do so was clear and manifest, the Court totally ig-
nored the Committee Report on the 1969 amendment to the preemp-
tion provision which stated that the language change simply "clarified"
the 1965 Act provision on the preemption of advertising provisions.2 1
Further, the "purposes" section of the 1969 Act was not changed from
the 1965 Act, but remained primarily concerned with "regulations." 242
238. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520. Only three justices-the Chief Justice and Justices
White and O'Connor-joined in section V of the Court's opinion discussing the 1969 Act.
Id. at 505. Justices Kennedy and Souter joined in Justice Blackmun's opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part, from section V, and concurring in the judgment. Id. at
506. Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justice Thomas, finding both Acts preempted the
damages actions in issue. Id. at 506-07. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether
the 1969 Act, as interpreted by Justice Stevens, preempts common law damages actions
or not.
239. The 1965 Act's preemption provision, § 5(b), stated that "[nlo statement" shall
be imposed under state law that is inconsistent with the warning label required by the
1965 Act. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518. The 1969 Act's preemption provision was
slightly different in that it prohibits any requirements or prohibition based on smoking
and health imposed under state law with respect to advertising or promotion. Id. at 520.
The legislative history suggests that these changes were intended only to clarify, not
broaden, the scope of the preemption. Id. at 540 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
240. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520-21 n.18. It is highly likely that attorneys for the to-
bacco companies would have argued for the broadest preemption possible from the statu-
tory changes had they even an inkling of support for it in precedent, interpretation anal-
ysis, or legislative history.
241. Id. at 520.
242. Id. Even though there were other indications in the legislative history to sup-
port the finding that Congress was primarily concerned with regulations and positive en-
actments and not common law damages actions, the Court still considered the preemp-
tion provision changes "substantial" to include those actions in its scope. Id. at 520-21.
On the interpretation of the changes to the 1969 Act, Justice Blackmun in dissent said:
Viewing the revisions to § 5(b) as generally nonsubstantive in nature makes
sense. By replacing the word "statement" with the slightly broader term, "re-
quirement," and adding the word "prohibition" to ensure that a State could
not do through negative mandate (e.g., banning all cigarette advertising) that
which it already was forbidden to do through positive mandate (e.g., mandat-
ing particular cautionary statements), Congress sought to "clarifiy]" the ex-
isting precautions against confusing and nonuniform state laws and
regulations.
Just as it acknowledges the evidence that Congress' changes in the pre-
emption provision were nonsubstantive, the plurality admits that "portions of
the legislative history of the 1969 Act suggest that Congress was primarily
concerned with positive enactments by States and localities.". . . Indeed, the
relevant Senate report explains that the revised pre-emption provision is "in-
tended to include not only action by State statute but by all other adminis-
trative actions or local ordinances or regulations by any political subdivisions
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Therefore, it was a small step for the Court to conclude that "com-
mon law damages actions of the sort raised by petitioner are premised
on the existence of a legal duty and it is difficult to say that such ac-
tions do not impose 'requirements or prohibitions.'"- The Court found
the phrase "State law" to include common law damages actions even
though Congress had both included "common law" in preemption provi-
sions before and had used savings clauses before to preserve damages
actions when it thought that its preemption provisions might be con-
strued too broadly.24 In this case, it did not, and the Court found this
consistent with its conclusion that only some common law damages ac-
tions are preempted while others are not.245 In comparing the Court's
analysis of the 1965 and 1969 Acts, it is clear the Court changed its
approach and analysis of preemption in a significant way based on in-
significant changes.
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun art-
fully points out the inconsistencies in the plurality's analysis of the
1969 Act's provisions.246 Justice Blackmun noted that while common
law damages actions exert a regulatory effect on manufacturers, as the
Court assumed, the issue of the extent of that effect and whether Con-
gress intended to halt that effect by the chosen preemption language is
much more complicated and is unanswered by the statute's ambiguous
preemption section.247 Further, Justice Blackmun points out that there
of any State," a list remarkable for the absence of any reference to common-
law damages actions.
Id. at 540 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun
further notes the inconsistency in the Court's reliance on § 2, regarding purposes, in de-
fining the scope of the 1965 Act but its refusal to acknowledge the importance of that
same unamended section in the 1969 Act. Id. at 540-41 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
243. Id. at 522.
244. Id.
245. Id. The Court then discusses which actions are preempted-those relying for
recovery on the warning or advertising language such as the failure to warn claims and
the misrepresentation claims-but not those that do not, like the fraud, express war-
ranty and conspiracy claims. Id. at 523-31. The inquiry being: whether the legal duty
predicating the common law damages action constitutes a "requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health ... imposed under State law with respect to advertising
or promotion," giving that clause a fair but narrow reading. Id.
246. Id. at 534-40 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. Id. at 535 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Blackmun continued:
The effect of tort law on a manufacturer's behavior is necessarily indi-
rect. Although an award of damages by its very nature attaches additional
consequences to the manufacturer's continued unlawful conduct, no particular
course of action (e.g., the adoption of a new warning label) is required. A
manufacturer found liable on, for example, a failure-to-warn claim may re-
spond in a number of ways. It may decide to accept damages awards as a cost
of doing business and not alter its behavior in any way. Or by contrast, it
may choose to avoid future awards by dispensing warnings through a variety
of alternative mechanisms, such as package inserts, public service advertise-
ments, or general educational programs. The level of choice that a defendant
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is no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress intended to
leave injured plaintiffs without alternative remedies for conduct other-
wise unlawful under state law traditionally governing such
responsibilities.
24
Most important, Justice Blackmun notes the Court's reversal from
its previous hesitancy to find federal preemption where Congress pro-
vided no comparable remedy. 9 Once the Court found express preemp-
tion of the warning claims from the ambiguous connection of the pre-
emption language, "no requirement or prohibition" based on
"advertising or promotion," it opened the door for all express preemp-
tion provisions to be read as broadly. The Court reached its conclusion
with no indication that Congress would have approved such a result
and, indeed, in the face of evidence to the contrary. As Justice
Blackmun concluded:
By finding federal preemption of certain state common law damages
claims, the Court today eliminates a critical component of the State's
traditional ability to protect the health and safety of their citizens.
Yet such a radical readjustment of federal-state relations is war-
ranted under this Court's precedents only if there is clear evidence
that Congress intended that result.uo
1. Effect of Cipollone on the culture of irresponsibility
Even more than did Boyle or East River Steamship, Cipollone af-
fects the way institutional actors perceive the legal responsibilities im-
posed on them to prevent the creation of unreasonable risks of
harm. 251 Because it provides a mechanism for those actors to lay the
responsibility for their conduct at the feet of Congress, there is no in-
retains in shaping its own behavior distinguishes the indirect regulatory ef-
fect of the common law from positive enactments such as statutes and admin-
istrative regulations. Moreover, tort law has an entirely separate function-
compensating victims-that sets it apart from direct forms of regulation.
Id. at 536-37 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
248. I& at 539 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. Id. at 541 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Unlike
the plurality, I am unwilling to believe that Congress, without any mention of state com-
mon law damages actions or of its intention dramatically to expand the scope of federal
preemption, would have eliminated the only means of judicial recourse for those injured
by cigarette manufacturers' unlawful conduct." Id. at 542 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
250. Id. at 544 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices
Scalia and Thomas would have found express preemption based on the 1965 Act and the
1969 Acts, disagreeing with the presumption against preemption and the narrow read-
ing of express preemption provisions. Id. at 544-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
251. See Kahn, supra note 228, at 1132, 1141-45 (concluding preemption encour-
ages compliance with less rigorous safety standards, reduces costs to regulated parties,
and encourages irresponsibility).
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centive to act more responsibly than the minimum Congress, in all of
its dubious wisdom, requires. While it is true that there is a healthy
amount of federal regulation regarding safety issues in the workplace,
in the regulation of our food and health care, and in our transporta-
tion, it is also true that much of that regulation is a result of years of
abuse by the industries regulated in policing themselves. 2 2 Conse-
quently, unless Congress unambiguously indicates a willingness to im-
munize the institutional defendant from the traditional state law dam-
ages remedies (that have always served as the first line of defense
against unreasonable practices), it seems manifestly inappropriate to
do so in Congress's place with a tortured statutory interpretation. By
doing so, the Court supports an even stronger claim by institutional
defendants in the existence of an entitlement to the right of immunity.
2. Cipollone's effect on other regulatory schemes
Of the many federal regulatory schemes, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)253 and the Medical Device
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (MDA)
254
provide the best comparisons to the regulatory scheme for cigarette la-
beling found in Cipollone. Both FIFRA and MDA have express preemp-
tion provisions and both statutes have fairly specific requirements re-
garding the products they regulate, like the statutes in Cipollone.2
5
The post-Cipollone treatment of the scope of the preemption provisions
in these two regulatory schemes will provide insights into the effect of
another Supreme Court opinion on the culture of irresponsibility.
a. Preemption under FIFRA. FIFRA authorizes the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate comprehensively the produc-
tion, distribution, and use of pesticides. The EPA, with Congress's ap-
proval, exclusively and extensively regulates pesticide labeling
requirements.25 6 The express preemption provision, like the preemption
provision at issue in Cipollone, provides that a state "shall not impose
or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in ad-
252. The legislative histories of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 651 (1994), and the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (1994), for exam-
ple, bear this out. See also Kahn, supra note 228, at 1131.
253. 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -1 3 6 y (1994).
254. 21 US.C. §§ 360e(c)(1), 360k(a) (1994).
255. For a discussion of the FIFRA express preemption provision, see infra notes
256-68 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the MDA express preemption provi-
sion, see infra notes 269-309 and accompanying text.
256. FIFRA requires that labels be "adequate to protect health and the environ-
ment," 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(G), and "likely to be read and understood" Id. § 136(q)(1)(E).
The regulations contain specific language, size, color and placement requirements as
well. 40 C.F.R& § 156.10(a)(1)-(4) (1995). The states are allowed to regulate the sale and
use of pesticides only to the extent that such regulation does not violate FIFRA 7 US.C.
§ 136v(a) (1994).
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dition to or different from those required" under FIFRA.257 Prior to
Cipollone, most courts rejected an express preemption argument under
the statute, primarily because Congress had not mentioned common
law damages awards in the statute.258 Pre-Cipollone courts analyzed
the statute under implied preemption and disagreed on whether com-
mon law damages actions were available.259 A conclusion of no express
preemption is consistent with the EPA's regulatory scheme which al-
lows the manufacturer to design and formulate the content of a warn-
ing label based on EPA requirements.
260
Since Cipollone, most courts addressing the scope of the FIFRA
preemption provision have concluded that it expressly preempts com-
mon law damages actions for failure to warn.261 Of the post-Cipollone
federal court cases interpreting the FIFRA preemption provision, only
two have found no express preemption and one of those was reversed
on appeal.262 The courts finding express preemption base their deci-
257. 7 US.C. § 136v(b) (emphasis added).
258. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 US. 1062 (1984); Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp.
1339, 1343 (D. Mont. 1991), aff'd, 993 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1993); Evenson v. Osmose Wood
Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
259. Compare Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1539-42 (finding no preemption because common
law damages actions do not frustrate federal regulatory objectives because Congress in-
tended standards as a floor, not a ceiling), with Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 970
F.2d 1301, 1306 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding preemption when damages actions coercive), and
Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding preemption be-
cause EPA has exclusive right to regulate), vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505
US. 1215 (1992).
260. See 7 US.C. § 136a(c)(1)(B)-(E) (requiring manufacturer to file a statement
with EPA which includes name of pesticide, complete copy of labeling, statement of
claims made for its use, directions for use, and a full description of tests made and re-
sults); 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (listing EPA requirements governing scope, content, wording,
and format of herbicide labeling).
261. Several federal courts have found FIFRA preemption. See, e.g., Bice v. Leslie's
Poolmart, Inc., 39 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 1994); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021
(5th Cir. 1994); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993); King v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 US. 985 (1993);
Burt v. Fumigation Serv. & Supply, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 624 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Kuiper v.
American Cyanamid Co., 913 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Bingham v. Terminix Intl
Co., 850 F. Supp. 516 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Trinity Mountain Seed Co. v. MSD Agvet, 844 F.
Supp. 597 (D. Idaho 1994); Wright v. Dow Chem. US.A_, 845 F. Supp. 503 (M.D. Tenn.
1993); Kinser v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 837 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Levesque v. Miles,
Inc., 816 F. Supp. 61 (D.N.H. 1993); Gibson v. Dow Chem. Co., 842 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Ky.
1992); Casper v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
262. Several district courts have concluded that FIFRA did not preempt common
law tort claims. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 813 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Tex.
1993), rev'd, 27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Couture v. Dow Chem. US.A., 804 F. Supp.
1298 (D. Mont. 1992); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co. 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). But
see Bingham, 850 F. Supp. at 520-21 (strongly criticizing MacDonald and Couture).
Burke, in fact, relied on the analysis in Ferebee, suggesting that
FIFRAs preemption clause shares some of the characteristics of the narrower
1965 Aces preemption clause. In addition, unlike the more restrictive 1969
cigarette law, FIFRA provides a general savings clause explicitly authorizing
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sions on how closely the language of the preemption decision tracks
the language in the 1969 Act involved in Cipollone.263 This is so even
though the Court concluded that the 1965 Act language in Cipollone
did not expressly preempt common law damages actions. 2 4 One would
think that courts interpreting the plurality opinion in Cipollone, badly
fractured on the scope of express preemption, would not blindly adhere
to the most restrictive view of that opinion but would more thoroughly
analyze both the language of challenged regulatory schemes and the
traditional role of common law damages actions as encouraging safety
and civic responsibility that both the Court and Congress have
recognized.
265
At the heart of the FIFRA preemption debate, as in Cipollone, is
the role of common law damages actions as regulatory vehicles. If it is
at all possible that damages actions deter inappropriate conduct,
266
surely such actions have a conduct-regulating effect, thus making
them regulatory. If the goal of preemption analysis in this context is
maintaining a balance between encouraging responsible conduct, the
traditional domain of state tort law, and respecting Congress's role in
legislating federal affairs, then the initial conclusion that damages ac-
tions are regulatory should not be the beginning and end of the in-
quiry.267 Once the Court focused the analysis purely on the regulatory
effect of common law damages actions, any debate on the nature of re-
each state to "regulate the sale or use" of federally registered pesticides
within its borders. While courts must ordinarily construe preemption clauses
narrowly, they must be especially cautious when Congress itself has identi-
fied an extremely broad area of authorized state conduct.
Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1140.
263. See, e.g., King, 996 F.2d at 1349.
264. Courts taking a more open view of the Court's Cipollone analysis have re-
flected on the 1965 Act's language as compared to the FIFRA provision and found the
two to be more similar than the 1969 Act and FIFRA. See Couture, 804 F. Supp. at 1302
(describing FIFRA's preemptive reach); Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1136-37 (explaining
FIFRA!s preemptive effect).
265. King is an example of this narrow view of the Cipollone decision. The King
court, in an opinion written by now Supreme Court Justice Breyer, evaluated the FIFRA
preemption provision as compared to the 1969 cigarette warning label requirement and
totally ignored any comparison to the 1965 Act requirement. King, 996 F.2d at 1349. The
King court also reviewed the legislative history of FIFRA and found that references to
preemption of "any State or local government labeling or packaging requirements" was
sufficiently broad to encompass state common law damages actions even though the lan-
guage is narrower and more specific than that used in the Cipollone statutes. Id. at
1350; see also Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, supra
note 228, at 269-70 (concluding common law tort doctrines do not fit the definition of
"requirements" well and textual and legislative history arguments for FIFRA preemption
are weak).
266. And this conclusion is subject to much debate. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality
in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter? 42 UCLA L. REV.
377, 422-30 (1994) (questioning the deterrent effect of tort suits).
267. For a discussion of the need to evaluate contemporary values and policies in
making the preemption determination, see Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Prod-
ucts Liability Doctrines, supra note 228, at 251-52.
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sponsible conduct defined by the common law and what it includes was
foreclosed. This is even more strikingly seen by the almost unanimous
conclusion by state courts that FIFRA broadly preempts state common
law damages actions.28 Deference is one thing, but given the nature of
the Court's plurality opinion, in which no more than four justices could
agree on the scope of the 1969 Act's provision, it is striking that state
courts would so willingly succumb to the Court's admittedly vague con-
clusion about the effect of a federal statute on the proper reach of
state responsibility rules.
b. Preemption under the MDA. The MDA enabled the FDA for
the first time to review medical devices for safety and effectiveness
and to expand protection against any such dangerous devices. 269 In so
doing, Congress also enacted a preemption provision prohibiting states
from "establish[ing] or continu[ing] in effect. . . any requirement...
268. Many states have concluded that FIFRA preempts common law damages ac-
tions. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Koppers Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 257 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (holding FIFRA preempts failure to warn claim); Buddington v. Sterling Winthrop,
Inc., 1993 WL 480960 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 1993) (same); ISK Biotech Corp. v.
Douberly, 640 So. 2d 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding FIFRA preempts negligent
failure to warn but not breach of warranty and strict liability claims), rev. denied, 651
So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1995); Brennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 613 So. 2d 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding FIFRA preempts claims based on inadequate labeling); ICI Ares. Inc. v.
Banks, 440 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding FIFRA preempts claim that manufac-
turer did not reveal data on human exposure incidents in EPA approval process); Hot-
tinger v. Trugreen Corp., 665 N.E.2d 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding FIFRA preempts
failure to warn claim); Schuver v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 546 N.W.2d 610 (Iowa
1996) (same); Jenkins v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 886 P.2d 869 (Kan. 1994) (same); Hopkins
v. American Cyanamid Co., 674 So. 2d 1042 (La. 1996) (finding FIFRA preempts inade-
quate labeling, packaging, and warning claims); Moody v. Chevron Chem. Co., 505
N.W.2d 900 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (finding FIFRA preempts failure to warn claims), app.
denied, 525 N.W2d 450 (Mich. 1994); Muzzy v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1993 WL
761991 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 2, 1993) (holding FIFRA preempts common law tort
claims); Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62, (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
FIFRA preempts state wrongful death action based on labeling); Davidson v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931 (Nev. 1992) (finding FIFRA impliedly preempts failure to
warn claims); Macrie v. SDS Biotech Corp., 630 A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(holding FIFRA preemption applies only to warnings given to purchaser/user); Sirico v.
Beckerle Lumber Supply Co., 642 N.Y.S.2d 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding FIFRA
preempts inadequate labeling and failure to warn claims); Elde v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 542 N.W.2d 769 (S.D. 1996) (same); Elam v. Quest Chem. Corp., 898
S.W2d 819 (Tex. 1995) (finding FIFRA preempts claims on labeling or packaging); Hue v.
Farmboy Spray Co., 896 P.2d 682 (Wash. 1995) (finding FIFRA preempts claims based on
breach of implied warranty).
For a discussion of whether FIFRA preempts misrepresentation claims, see Gorton v.
American Cyanamid Co., 533 N.W.2d 746 (Wis. 1995) (finding no preemption). Most
courts hold that FIFRA does not preempt design and manufacturing defect claims. Ar-
kansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 886 F. Supp. 762 (D. Colo. 1995);
Jenkins v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 886 P.2d 869 (Kan. 1994).
269. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1994). For a complete discussion of the history of the
amendments, see SusAN BARTLE'r FOOTE, MANAGING THE MEDICAL ARMS RACE: INNOVA-
TION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDusTRY (1992).
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which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this [Act] . . . which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to
the device."
2 70
Based on how courts have interpreted the FIFRA preemption pro-
vision after Cipollone, it will not come as a surprise that courts evalu-
ating the MDA provision almost unanimously find the use of the word
"requirement" in that provision sufficient as a basis for express pre-
emption of most, and in some cases all, state common law claims. The
opinions frequently lack any meaningful analysis of the major differ-
ences in the MDA, FIFRA, and cigarette labeling provisions that have
been the subject of preemption analysis. 2 7 1 The broad protection
Cipollone's analysis afforded for otherwise irresponsible conduct has
continued. Medical device manufacturers successfully relied on
Cipollone for immunity from liability even though the avowed purpose
of the MDA was to provide for increased safety. The presumption
against preemption appeared to have been swallowed up in the inter-
pretive tools of "clear meaning" and "congressional intent."
The Supreme Court recently revisited preemption analysis in the
medical devices context in Medtronic, Ina v. Lohr.272 This decision was
supposed to clear up preemption analysis significantly, particularly in
the medical devices setting where courts of appeals had widely varying
interpretations of the preemptive scope of the MDA since Cipollone.
Before turning to Lohr, it will be helpful to have a brief explanation of
the framework of the MDA and canvas the pre-Lohr decisions to get a
feel for what Cipollone had wrought in this particular preemption
arena.2 7 3 As will be discussed, the regulatory scheme in the MDA is
significantly more complex and leaves much more room for states to
regulate explicitly.
The FDA has authority to interpret the MDA's express preemption
provision274 and has interpreted it to preempt state or local require-
270. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
271. See, eg., Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 510 U.S. 824 (1995). For a complete discussion of cases finding preemption, see
supra note 268 and accompanying text.
272. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
273. See generally Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical
Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REv. 895, 923-42 (1994) (arguing that, based
on a thorough reading of the preemption provisions of the MDA and regulations relating
to it, neither Congress nor the FDA intended to preempt state tort law claims); see also
Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the Government
Standards Defense, 37 Wi. & MARY L. REV. 903, 908 (1996) (describing preemption deci-
sion as "sweeping").
274. For a discussion of the preemption provision, 21 U.S.C. § 360k, see supra note
270 and accompanying text. Section 360k(b) gives the FDA the power to exempt require-
ments from the scope of subsection (a) if the requirement is "more stringent than a re-
quirement under this chapter" or the requirement is "required by compelling local condi-
tions" and would not violate any other applicable requirement under the MDA. Id.
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ments "only when the [FDA] has established specific counterpart regu-
lations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particu-
lar device" and not when there are only state "requirements of general
applicability."275 The MDA is a complex system with a variety of ap-
proval processes, each of which leaves some flexibility in the manufac-
turer's hands, very unlike the labeling requirement in Cipollone.276 For
example, before a medical device can be marketed, the manufacturer
must obtain approval depending on whether the device is a Class I, II,
or III device.277 Class III devices are those which are implanted in the
body or pose an unreasonable risk of injury.27s Because of their danger-
ousness, Class III devices are required to obtain premarket approval
§ 360k(b). To carry out its authority, the FDA has issued regulations which construe the
preemption provision generally and which describe the circumstances in which the FDA
will grant an exemption. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (1995).
275. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) provides:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the [FDA] has es-
tablished specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific require-
ments applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making any ex-
isting divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different
from, or in addition to, the specific [FDA] requirements ....
(1) Section [360k(a)] does not preempt State or local requirements of
general applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates ei-
ther to other products in addition to devices . . . or to unfair trade
practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices.
276. For a description of the MDA regulatory scheme, see Adler & Mann, supra
note 273, at 923-42; Lars Noah, Amplification of Federal Preemption in Medical Device
Cases, 49 FooD & DRUG L.J. 183 (1994). For an analysis of the MDA scheme by the first
court of appeals to buck the preemption trend, see Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d
1453, 1457-59 (9th Cir 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996). In Kennedy, the court
explained the complexity of the MDA regulatory scheme and noted that preemption oc-
curs only if there exists a "specific requirement applicable to a particular device." Id. at
1459. Finding that the premarket approval process is no such "specific requirement"
when most other courts of appeals had, the Ninth Circuit stated:
As the Supreme Court held in Silkwood, it is incredible to believe that
Congress would, without comment, void all means of relief for those injured
by illegal conduct. State common law damages actions guarantee people who
are injured by a manufacturer the opportunity to be compensated for their
harm. State regulation of manufacturers directly governs their actions in re-
leasing their goods into the market. Thus, state common law serves a differ-
ent purpose than state regulation and is unlikely to have been the target of
congressional attempts to promote the introduction of safe medical devices
onto the market or even to curb dual regulation of the medical devices
industry.
Id. After deciding Lohr, the Court denied the petition for review in Kennedy, letting the
opinion stand. Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996).
277. Class I devices are those which pose little or no threat to the public health. 21
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (1994); 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (1995). Class II devices include items
such as tampons, 21 C.F.R. § 884.5460(b) (1995), and oxygen masks, id. § 868.5655(b).
Because they involve some risk of injury, the FDA has performance standards,
postmarket surveillance programs, and guidelines for their use. 21 US.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A);
21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2).
278. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C); 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(3). Class III devices include
pacemakers, 21 C.F.R. § 870.3610(b) (1995), heart catheters, id. § 870.1350(b), penile
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before manufacture and marketing.279 Class III device cases constitute
the vast majority of the cases in which the preemption defense has
been interposed. It is interesting that the most hazardous products are
the ones for which manufacturers most want to shield themselves from
liability. A culture of irresponsibility? It would appear so.
A canvassing of the pre- and post-Cipollone preemption cases
under the MDA supports the conclusion that the MDA is being widely
interpreted as over-preemptive, given the lack of device-specific regula-
tions and the generic approval process basis of preemption. Prior to
Cipollone, courts' conclusions were mixed on the scope of the MDA pre-
emption provision, some finding preemption and others not.280 After
Cipollone, however, courts have been virtually unanimous in finding
preemption of most, and sometimes all, common law tort claims under
the MDA- 281 The preemption provision requires a "specific requirement
prostheses, id. § 876.3350(b), breast implants, id. § 878.3530(b), and other inherently
dangerous items.
279. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(A)-(G) (1994); 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (b)(2)-(12) (1995). The
application for premarket approval must contain all of the information on any investiga-
tions concerning the device's safety and effectiveness, a statement of the intended use of
the product, a description of the expected manufacturing process and any other re-
quested information. 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(3) (1995). There is no opportunity for public
challenge to the information presented to the FDA. Id. For descriptions of the premarket
approval process, see Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1453 and Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316,
1329 (3d Cir.) (finding preemption where heart valve one of first to obtain premarket ap-
proval under MDA), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995). For some products as to which a
substantial equivalent was already marketed prior to the MDA being enacted, a less rig-
orous approval process is required under § 510(k): the premarket notification process.
Applicants must submit device descriptions and other information sufficient for the FDA
to determine equivalence to a pre-MDA approved device. 21 C.F.R. § 807.87 (1995). See
Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding preemption "does not de-
pend on the route the product takes to the market" where penile prosthesis obtained
premarket approval); Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1352 (11th Cir. 1995) (same),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996); accord Mendes v. Mendtronic, Inc., 18
F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (preempting products liability suit regarding pacemaker under
MDA).
280. See Adler & Mann, supra note 273, at 917 nn.106-07; Ausness, Federal Pre-
emption of State Products Liability Doctrine, supra note 228, at 226-27. But see Noah,
supra note 273, at 926-27 ("Almost without exception, the lower courts have held that
this provision preempts tort claims to the extent that the FDA regulates a particular
medical device.").
281. Many federal cases have found preemption of state negligence and strict prod-
ucts liability claims. See, eg., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 70 F.3d 39 (6th Cir.
1995) (pacemaker); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1995) (Zyderm col-
lagen implant); English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1995) (penile prosthesis);
Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); Feldt v. Mentor
Corp., 61 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167
(8th Cir. 1994) (contact lenses), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995); Gile v. Optical Radi-
ation Corp., 22 F.3d 540 (3d Cir.) (intraocular lens), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994);
Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir.) (Zyderm collagen implant), cert. de-
nied, 510 U.S. 824 (1993); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993) (same);
Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 396 (D. Md. 1994) (pacemaker), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 82 F.3d 79 (4th Cir. 1996); Reiter v. Zimmer, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 199
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (bone cement).
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for a particular device";28 2 courts finding preemption have concluded
that the generic premarket approval processes are such specific re-
quirements. 28 Their analysis is often expressly based only on the exis-
tence of the word "requirement" in the language of the preemption pro-
vision in the MDA and in Cipollone, despite the significant differences
in the two regulatory schemes and the very different types of "require-
ments" present.2 The statutory scheme involved in Cipollone included
an explicit congressional, not administrative, mandate from which the
manufacturers could not deviate. Preemption of state law claims under
the MDA has been argued to be an unwarranted extension of the anal-
ysis and rationale of Cipollone. The sweeping post-Cipollone preemp-
tion decisions can be considered a knee-jerk reaction to the ambiguity
of Cipollone's analysis and result, an easy way of dealing with a diffi-
cult topic.
Further, the history and scope of the FDA would seem especially
suited to a detailed evaluation of congressional intent before conclud-
ing that the presumption against preemption of state police powers
specifically recognized in Cipollone should be overcome. The presump-
Some cases even find preemption of breach of express and implied warranty and
fraud claims despite that even Cipollone would not have preempted such claims under
the cigarette labeling acts involved there. See, e.g., Shiley, 46 F.3d 1316; King, 983 F.2d
1130; Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mich. 1994), vacated, 91 F.3d 143 (6th
Cir. 1996). For a particularly broad preemption decision, see Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
63 E3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995) (preempting plaintiff's fraud claim where conspiracy to de-
fraud FDA provided in criminal proceedings against defendant), cert. dismissed, 116 S.
Ct. 1892 (1996).
Many of the above court of appeals decisions were on appeal to the Supreme Court
when Lohr was decided. The Court granted certiorari and then vacated the judgment in
several cases in which preemption had been found. Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys.,
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996); English v.
Mentor Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 116 S. Ct.
2575 (1996); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996).
For examples of state cases finding preemption, see Evraets v. Intermedics Intraocu-
lar, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Connelly v. Iolab Corp., 1995 WL
250794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Ambrosio v. Barnes-Hind, Inc., 625 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1995); Green v. Dolsky, 641 A.2d 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). For examples of cases
not finding preemption, see Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw.),
amended in part on reh'g, 843 P.2d 144 (1992); Haudrich v. Howmedica Inc., 642 N.E.2d
206 (III. App. Ct. 1994); Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 894 P.2d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
282. For a discussion of 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995), and specific requirements, see
infra note 299 and accompanying text.
283. See King, 983 F.2d 1130; Martello, 42 F.3d 1167. These cases, and others, hold
all state law claims are preempted, even those for breach of express and implied warran-
ties, misrepresentation, and fraud.
284. The court of appeals decision in Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335 (11th
Cir. 1995), broadly interpreted the term "requirements" and found that common law ac-
tions are within the meaning of § 360k(a) for purposes of a preemption claim involving a
pacemaker marketed through premarket notification under § 510(k). Lohr, 56 F.3d at
1342-43. The court in Lohr found the design defect claims were not preempted, id. at
1347-49, but the failure to warn and manufacturing defect claims were preempted. Id. at
1350-51.
285. See Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1459; Adler & Mann, supra note 273, at 916-23.
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tion against preemption is particularly relevant regarding a scheme
like the FDA, which has always been considered to operate in addition
to and not instead of the state law tort system. The fact that the MDA
scheme is so much more detailed than the cigarette labeling act in
Cipollone should constitute a clear reason for lower courts to do a thor-
ough preemption analysis and not just rely on the presence of the term
"requirement." Cipollone's analysis of the 1969 Act's language and the
hopelessly fractured Court opinions on the regulatory effect of common
law damages actions has enabled lower courts to rest on the simple
analytical tool of "plain meaning" when the meaning of the MDA's pre-
emption provision is anything but plain.
Enter Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.28 The Court was asked to clarify the
MDA's preemption provision in the case of an allegedly defective pace-
maker lead which had been marketed under the MDA's premarket no-
tification, or section 510(k), procedure.28 7 The court of appeals' decision
reflected one of the many positions taken on the MDA's preemptive
scope, not the most restrictive nor the most permissive. The court of
appeals found common law damages actions to be "requirements
within the meaning of § 360k(a)."288 The court of appeals then con-
cluded that the section 510(k) procedure, which allows marketing with
much less scrutiny because the device is found substantially
equivalent to a device already on the market, was not a sufficient re-
quirement under the Act to preempt design claims, but that the good
manufacturing practices and labeling requirements were "require-
ments" so that claims based on manufacturing and warning were
preempted.2 9
As in Cipollone, the Lohr Court was in disagreement over the
scope of the term "requirement" for preemption purposes. In a plural-
ity opinion written by Justice Stevens, 290 the Court confirmed the pre-
emption interpretation principles discussed in Cipollone291 and then
286. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). After refusing to grant certiorari in several previous
MDA preemption cases, the Court finally did so. Id.
287. Id. at 2250. The court of appeals found the design claims were not preempted
but the manufacturing and warning claims were. Id. at 2249.
288. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1342. In Lohr, a pacemaker manufactured by the defendant
failed while implanted in the plaintiff Id. at 1338.
289. Id. at 1346, 1347-49.
290. Justice Stevens also wrote the plurality opinion in Cipollone. Cipollone v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992).
291. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2250. This portion of the opinion, section III, was a major-
ity opinion joined by Justice Breyer. The Court described the guiding principles as "two
presumptions about the nature of pre-emption Id. Those principles are "First. . . Con-
gress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action . . . . [W]e used a 'pre-
sumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations' to support a narrow
interpretation of such an express command in Cipollone." Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S.
at 508). In addition, the Court described its guiding interpretive principles in the form of
a second presumption that "any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute
must rest primarily on 'a fair understanding of congressional purpose.'" Id- (quoting Ci-
pollone, 505 U.S. at 529 n.27). That understanding is gleaned first, from the language of
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discussed in some detail whether the use of the term "requirement"
preempted all common law damage claims as Medtronic argued. Given
Cipollone's broad reading of the same term, it is not at all surprising
that Medtronic made this argument; that type of rather unprincipled
extension by a defendant manufacturer of an otherwise narrow "immu-
nity" is just the type of response Cipollone should have been expected
to elicit. The plurality, fortunately, concluded that the argument is
"not only unpersuasive, it is implausible."292 What is rather unfortu-
nate is that only four justices agreed with that assessment; the other
five found it not only plausible but likely that Congress's use of "re-
quirement" meant that common law damages claims were preempted,
at least in some respects.
29 3
Justice Stevens, in his opinion, analyzes the intent of Congress, as
interpretive principles require, and concludes that "Medtronic's con-
struction of § 360k would therefore have the perverse effect of granting
complete immunity from design defect liability to an entire industry
that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent regulation in
order 'to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices in-
tended for human use.' "294 In a fascinating twist, Justice Stevens relies
on the pre-Cipollone preemption case, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,295
to observe that it would be "difficult to believe that Congress would,
without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those in-
jured by illegal conduct" 296 Justice Stevens states that the language
used in the MDA is not plain enough to show such a congressional in-
tent.2 9 7 Justice Stevens concludes that the MDA does not sweep as
broadly as the statutory language in Cipollone298 and that none of the
plaintiff's claims are preempted because there is no specific federal
"requirement" applicable to the device on which to base preemption of
state law.29 9 Justice Stevens declines to respond to the plaintiff's argu-
the statute and second, the structure and purpose of the statute aided by a "reasoned
understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding
regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law." Id. at 2251.
292. Id. at 2251.
293. The plurality reversed the court of appeals in part, on the finding of preemp-
tion, and affirmed in part, on the finding of no preemption. Id. at 2243 (Breyer, J., con-
curring); id. at 2250-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding
partial preemption of manufacturing and warning claims).
294. Id. at 2251 (plurality opinion, Stevens, J.).
295. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
296. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2251 (citing Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251).
297. Id.
298. Id. Justice Stevens identifies the many differences between the two statutory
schemes and examines the purposes behind the legislation and their respective histories.
Id. at 2251-53. He concludes that the MDA's use of "requirements" was intended to reach
only positive law enactments by legislative or administrative bodies, not the application
of general common law rules. Id. at 2252. Justice Stevens also concludes that "[i]f Con-
gress intended such a result, its failure even to hint at it is spectacularly odd, particu-
larly since Members of both Houses were acutely aware of ongoing product liability liti-
gation." Id. at 2253.
299. Id. at 2252. Justice Stevens uses the FDA regulations to aid in the interpreta-
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ment that the MDA's use of "requirements" never includes common
law duties, given the finding of no preemption, and "given the critical
importance of device-specificity . . . it is apparent that few, if any,
common-law duties have been pre-empted by this statute."00 He con-
cludes that ilt will be rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law
cause of action to issue a decree" that is sufficiently precise to consti-
tute a preempted substantive device requirement.
30 1
The remainder of the Justices, given an opportunity to clarify the
meaning of "requirement" for preemption purposes, was again unwill-
ing to embrace Justice Blackmun's well-supported position in
Cipollone: that Congress cannot be said to have intended common law
damages actions to be preempted and thus destroy a traditional area
of state law protection.3 2 Justice Breyer, in concurrence, and Justice
O'Connor, in dissent, agreed in principle that common law causes of
action under the MDA constitute "requirements" for purposes of their
preemption. Justice Breyer concludes that the MDA "will sometimes
pre-empt a state-law tort suit;"30 3 where a state statute or regulation
would be preempted, "a similar requirement that takes the form of a
standard of care or behavior imposed by a state-law tort action"
30 4
would also be preempted. Justice O'Connor, relying heavily on
Cipollone and its analysis of the term "requirement," concludes that
the statute clearly preempts some state common-law claims30 5 without
tion of the scope of § 360k's preemptive effect. Id. at 2255. It is on this point that the
Justices were in substantial disagreement. Justice Stevens uses the regulations to in-
form the scope of the statute's preemptive effect, finding that "requirement" means a de-
vice-specific regulation must exist which governs the particular matter in dispute before
preemption will be found. Id. at 2257. The general requirements applicable to all medi-
cal devices, such as good manufacturing practices, are sufficiently specific to justify pre-
emption. Id. at 2258. Justice Breyer agrees that the regulation dealing with preemptive
scope, 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995), "does narrow the universe of federal requirements
that the agency intends to displace at least some state law." Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2261
(Breyer, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, in dissent, takes significant issue with the use
of the FDA regulation as an aid to interpretation of the statute, saying: "It is not certain
that an agency regulation determining the pre-emptive effect of any federal statute is
entitled to deference . . . but one pertaining to the clear statute at issue here is surely
not Id& at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
300. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2259.
301. Id.
302. For a discussion of this position, see supra note 249.
303. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring).
304. Id. at 2260 (Breyer, J., concurring). He concludes by suggesting, "It is possible
that the plurality also agrees on this point, although it does not say so explicitly." Id,
305. Id. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Whether relating to the labeling of cigarettes or the manufacture of medical
devices, state common-law damages actions operate to require manufacturers
to comply with common-law duties. As Cipollone declared, in answer to the
same argument raised here that common law actions do not impose require-
ments, "such an analysis is at odds both with the plain words" of the statute
and "with the general understanding of common-law damages actions."
Id. at 2263-64 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992). Justice
O'Connor concludes that the design claim is not preempted by the "substantial
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reference to the FDA preemption regulations on the point and in spite
of the lack of device-specific regulations pertinent to the device
involved.306
What to make of the Lohr opinion regarding the culture of irre-
sponsibility defined and explored in this article? The Court appears to
be softening its preemption analysis somewhat in light of Justice
Stevens' embrace of the idea that Congress's use of a single term need
not sweep as broadly as Cipollone suggested in the area of protecting
manufacturers from responsibility. It is disheartening that in an area
so clearly related to public health and safety the remaining five jus-
tices disagreed that unless Congress unequivocally states its intent to
disrupt state tort law remedies, it should not be deemed to have in-
tended to do so by judicial interpretation. The presumption against
preemption receives lip service again by a majority of the Court. The
usual attempt to squeeze additional immunities in the form of feder-
ally preempted state actions can be expected to follow in the other
statutory schemes not yet addressed by the Court. FIFRA, the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act, 307 the Consumer Product Safety Act,308 and
others are likely to provide fertile preemption arguments, and count-
less judicial opinions, in spite of Lohr.
That courts would find preemption of the wide array of common
law tort claims in the medical device area indicates the strong effect
the Cipollone decision has had on encouraging institutional defendants
to ignore their responsibility and seek to be immunized when they are
arguably not so entitled. The Court's own confusion in Lohr, though
somewhat clarifying and narrowing the scope of preemption under the
MDA, will continue to encourage defendants to seek the outer limits of
their immunities. Of course, parties will try to extend the law in a way
that makes it applicable to protect them or allow them recovery. This
is what lawyers are supposed to do. The concern expressed in
Cipollone, and in the concurring and dissenting opinions in Lohr, over
the extensive regulatory effect of common law tort actions has been
over-embraced by lower courts, however, and has become an apparent
license to curtail long-recognized civil responsibilities imposed by state
tort laws. Those responsibilities encourage product safety in ways that
equivalency" process of § 510(k) approval, but that the manufacture and warning claims
are preempted because state law claims might impose requirements different from or in
addition to the general MDA requirements applicable to them. Id. at 2263-64.
306. Id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
307. See Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 644 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (pre-
empting warning claim with FHSA), aff'd, 662 N.E.2d 397 (I1.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
55 (1996).
308. One court of appeals has recently found preemption based on the 25-year-old
Consumer Product Safety Act and a safety standard for lawn mowers. See Moe v. MTD
Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1995). This decision is being cited as the first signifi-
cant court of appeals decision on the Act's preemptive scope. See also Cortez v. MTD
Prods., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 386, 390 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (extending the preemptive scope of
Consumer Product Safety Act).
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regulatory schemes do not.30 9 The Court's influence in this area has
been profound, and has perpetuated an extensive culture of irresponsi-
bility whose growth shows no sign of slowing.
III. CHALLENGING THE CULTURE OF IRRESPONSIBILITY
The avoidance of responsibility catalogued in the above opinions
and their progeny is rarely criticized by the purveyors of "tort reform"
as an unnecessary extension of "rights" over "responsibilities." Rather,
the expansion of these immunities from responsibility is usually sanc-
tioned by those very commentators, scholars, and judges who see a
failure of the similar responsibility by victims of tortious conduct.
3 10
The Court's decisions, based as they are on individualism and eco-
nomic freedom, promote abuse of the "rights" recognized, not because
immunities are always inappropriate but because the Court strains to
immunize conduct to protect the interests of the institution over the
individual. "Rights" achieved in this way are not hard won but come
too easily to be given respect; they are too easy to take for granted be-
cause they are unearned and, therefore, easy to abuse.
The Court may not realize that it is encouraging a culture of irre-
sponsibility, but perceptions usually operate absent the intent or
knowledge of the creator. Even though the Court has limited the direct
effect of immunity on products liability and tort jurisprudence, the ex-
pansion of the immunities it has created through East River Steam-
ship, Boyle, and Cipollone point out that the Court should be more cog-
nizant of its influence, come to terms with its influential role and
choose a leadership role in the responsibility debate. If the Court con-
tinues on its current path, its decisions will continue to combine with
other perceptions of irresponsibility 1 ' to influence negatively society's
dedication to responsible conduct.
"No single principle is capable of explaining the full extent of tort
law."31 2 The Supreme Court has perpetuated through its opinions a
perception that certain irresponsible conduct should be given a stamp
of approval and emphasizes the institutional defendant's efficiency and
protection from unlimited liability concerns over other moral principles
that equally serve to explain the basis of tort responsibilities. 3 13 The
cases chronicled in this article, decided by the Supreme Court over the
last ten years, reflect the variety of principles which form the basis of
tort law: corrective justice notions, efficiency norms, and general prin-
309. See Adler & Mann, supra note 273, at 916-23 nn. 125-27.
310. See, eg., HUBER, supra note 2.
311. For a discussion of perceptions of irresponsibility, see supra notes 2-25 and ac-
companying text.
312. Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pt. 2), 2
LAw & PHiL. 5, 36 (1983).
313. For an attempt to define the moral foundations of products liability, see David
G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 427 (1993).
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ciples of autonomy and equality. The Court has chosen to focus on the
utilitarian, wealth-maximizing norms over other principles and, to that
extent, has forsaken those other principles which inform our notion of
"responsible" conduct.
Each of the cases analyzed above rested primarily on the principle
that conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of harm, defined by
some objective, risk-utility balance, should be subject to liability be-
cause, at a minimum, unreasonable risks of harm are irresponsibly
created. In East River Steamship, the court of appeals opinion had bal-
anced the need to minimize unlimited liability with the need to impose
liability for otherwise tortious conduct by defining recovery using an
intermediate approach.3 14 The Supreme Court instead chose to define
immunity from otherwise tortious conduct by totally denying recovery
for economic loss in strict products liability.315 Courts which had not
considered the issue quickly and virtually unanimously agreed. Per-
haps the force of the Court's analysis was such that other courts decid-
ing the issue simply could not disagree in logic or legal principle. It is
unlikely, however, that state courts deciding a purely state law issue
would feel so compelled to agree with the Supreme Court were it not
also for the Court's cultural influence.
In Boyle, the court of appeals had defined a limited "military" con-
tractor defense based on established federal precedents.316 The Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision, but on a much broader basis than
was necessary to decide the limited issue before it, and created federal
common law with which to support its new preemption defense. 317
Post-Boyle cases indicate the widespread expansion of Boyle to areas
where, by its own terms, it does not apply.318 Lower courts read Boyle
in its broadest application, not necessarily because that is the correct
legal analysis, but because that is its logical extension based on how
the Court extended the immunity concerned to areas where no court
previously would have thought it would extend. The Court's govern-
ment contractor defense was broader in Boyle than anyone had previ-
ously sought to extend it. Recognition of such an immunity, and the le-
gal analysis that led to its creation, can only serve to encourage lower
courts to similarly extend the immunity to areas not contemplated
even by the institutional defendants it protects. That recognition of im-
314. For a discussion of the court of appeals' balancing in East River Steamship,
see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. In East River Steamship, the basis of lia-
bility was strict liability, a non-fault based measure of responsibility that takes into con-
sideration loss allocation and the most efficient cost avoider as the primary bases of im-
posing responsibility. East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870
(1986).
315. For a discussion of East River Steamship, see supra notes 26-58 and accompa-
nying text.
316. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 425 (1986).
317. For a discussion of Boyle, see supra notes 78-117 and accompanying text.
318. For a discussion of Boyle's progeny, see supra notes 118-222 and accompany-
ing text.
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munities in such situations encourages those benefited by the immu-
nity to continue to seek its expansion is not a surprise; it is a natural
effort to "abuse" the right created.
In Cipollone, the Court similarly broke with its own precedents to
provide in essence a two-pronged federal preemption defense to the op-
eration of traditional state tort law: preemption must be based on an
express preemption provision if one exists, but express preemption pro-
visions are not to be read narrowly in scope, as the Court said they
should, but rather broadly as the Court did in its analysis. 19 And sub-
sequent courts have read such provisions exceptionally broadly. The
treatment of the MDA preemption provision is particularly apposite in
this regard. Courts after Cipollone read the term "requirement" and
find preemption. There is no additional analysis and the Court's
Cipollone opinion does not encourage any. While Congress has the
power to preempt state law, the presumption against preemption the
Court purportedly recognizes is in truth given no more than lip service
in the process.
In Lohr, the Court appears willing to continue to recognize the im-
plied preemption doctrines even though in Cipollone it clearly said it
would stand on an express preemption provision where one existed.
320
Further, in Lohr, Justice Stevens appeared to be trying to right a
"wrong" from Cipollone: the overbreadth of interpretation of the scope
of preemption provisions. While his effort may make the MDA preemp-
tion analysis somewhat clearer, his brethren remain remarkably com-
mitted to an idea of preemption analysis that is of very recent vintage,
essentially being born in Cipollone: that Congress, without expressly
stating, intends to destroy the operation of traditional state law tort
remedies in areas traditionally left to state regulation even when the
statute does not create a remedy in its place.
The Supreme Court has chosen in each of these cases to lower the
floor of acceptable behavior by its provision of broad immunity rules in
the areas of recovery for economic loss, availability of federal immuni-
ties, and preemption doctrines. In all these cases, the otherwise appli-
cable rule of liability is a state tort rule that would impose reasonable
product manufacturer conduct based on a balancing of the risks and
benefits of the product. The Court's opinions, therefore, provide immu-
nity for conduct which is, by all measures, not judged by particularly
rigorous state law standards.
To be sure, very good reasons support immunity rules, but the
Court makes the efficiency norms it relies upon prove too much. The
need to limit potentially unlimited liability and the need for certainty
and predictability in the definition of liability rules will always be rea-
sons to lower the standard of responsibility. There must nonetheless be
a meaningful standard upon which to base liability which encourages
319. For a discussion of Cipollone, see supra notes 223-50 and accompanying text.
320. For a discussion of Myrick, see supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
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responsible conduct. The Court's relentless focus on preserving the eco-
nomic health of the institutional actor fails completely to balance the
need for such preservation with the need to encourage responsibility.
The following excerpt from Mary Ann Glendon's Rights Talk aptly de-
scribes the danger of focusing on the "rights" side of the equation with-
out balanced attention to the "responsibilities" side-imagine that the
reference to "it" is a reference to the Court:
In its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone accept-
ance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state,
without accepting the corresponding personal and civic obligations.
In its relentless individualism, it fosters a climate that is inhospita-
ble to society's losers, and that systematically disadvantages caretak-
ers and dependents, young and old. In its neglect of civil society, it
undermines the principal seedbeds of civic and personal virtue. In its
insularity, it shuts out potentially important aids to the process of
self-correcting learning. All of these traits promote mere assertion
over reason-giving.321
The Court had a number of methods from which to choose to re-
solve the legal issues raised in the cases discussed in this article. The
method chosen in each of these diverse contexts has significant impact
beyond the operation of the rule of law selected to govern the specific
circumstances, as has been demonstrated. The Court has created a
zone of conduct by institutional actors which can only be described as
irresponsible but for which no liability will attach. More important, it
has sent the message that immune irresponsible conduct is not really
so irresponsible at all. The perception of responsibility where none ex-
ists contributes to a fundamental confusion in society about when ac-
tors should take responsibility for their actions. The Court has re-
treated from its responsibility and, in the process, made matters
worse.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has a profound influence in our lives in more
than the legal principles it expounds. It both encourages and discour-
ages us; it is like a parent in the way it disciplines us when we misbe-
have and congratulates us when we do not. And like a parent, it must
sometimes do what is unpleasant to ensure that we do not venture
into situations which will cause us unnecessary harm. And the Court
must do so consistently so that we understand that it really means
what it says.
Unfortunately, the Court has been consistent in one of its actions:
its recognition of "rights" to immunity that have perpetuated the cul-
ture of irresponsibility in many of society's most powerful actors. The
analogy to the bully is apposite; institutional actors whose conduct
321. GLENDON, supra note 16, at 14.
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would otherwise be deterred by liability are otherwise being given the
freedom to engage in that conduct with impunity. Like the bully, fail-
ing to take action to stop the offending behavior only encourages fur-
ther misbehaving, usually of a more serious nature. Similarly, the
Court's immunity rules in the last decade in civil tort responsibility
are encouraging institutional defendants to stretch the "right" to be ir-
responsible as far as they will go. This is lazy "parenting" by the Court
and has already led to an expansion of the immunities to areas that
the Court likely never expected or intended. The Court has the oppor-
tunity, and obligation, to reconsider the extension of the "rights" it has
created in the light of their treatment by the lower courts and the in-
stitutional actors whom they benefit.
